Zambia

Zambia is unlikely to be directly involved in significant armed conflict in the next three years, with risk concentrated in localized security operations and election-linked unrest rather than sustained warfare.

Zambia is very likely to avoid significant armed conflict over the next 12 months. Expect heightened political friction as the 2026 election approaches, with the main downside risk being isolated lethal incidents tied to policing of rallies/protests. Security operations against illegal mining and cross-border crime may produce sporadic shootings, but bilateral coordination with neighbors and routine de-escalation channels should contain escalation.

Beyond three years, risk hinges on whether election administration and public-order policing erode legitimacy enough to normalize cycles of violent repression and retaliation, and whether illicit mining rents catalyze durable armed networks. A material upward shift would likely require security-force fracture, sustained armed-group organization, or a major regional spillover shock. Absent those, Zambia should remain a low-conflict state with localized criminal violence and periodic political unrest.

Net Assessment Base rate still favors continuity: Zambia remains a comparatively stable Southern African state with episodic political friction and criminal violence but no clear pathway to sustained armed conflict. New reporting about army deployments against illegal mining and armed suspects signals a public-order and organized-crime challenge, not insurgency or state breakdown.

Threat Drivers Domestic political contestation is the primary channel. Human-rights reporting indicates a tightening environment for dissent and opposition activity ahead of the 2026 elections, including use of public-order restrictions and concerns about police impartiality. This raises the probability of protest–police clashes and targeted political violence, but current indicators do not show armed-group formation, territorial control contests, or security-force fragmentation.

Transnational crime and border insecurity are the secondary channel. Zambia’s trade corridors and borders (especially with the DRC) face banditry risks affecting trucking routes, cattle theft, and illicit flows. The illegal mining issue in North-Western Province, including claims of military-grade weapons among illegal miners, increases the chance of sporadic firefights during enforcement operations. These remain geographically bounded and typically degrade with sustained policing, intelligence work, and judicial follow-through.

Interstate conflict risk remains low. Despite regional instability in the Great Lakes, Zambia’s incentives are to protect trade and copperbelt-linked logistics, not to project force. Recent Zambia–DRC joint commission outcomes emphasize cooperative border security and joint measures, which function as de-escalation channels.

Resilience and Systemic Firebreaks Key stabilizers include a history of peaceful transfers of power, limited ethno-territorial secession pressures, and a generally professional security sector with constrained resources that limits both war-making capacity and coup/fragmentation dynamics. Regional institutions and bilateral mechanisms (SADC/AU norms and Zambia–DRC security commissions) provide diplomatic off-ramps. Governance and rights concerns are meaningful early-warning signals for unrest, but they are not yet structural precursors to civil war.

Watch Indicators Repeated lethal crowd-control incidents across provinces; sustained post-election unrest; credible evidence of security-force politicized splitting; durable armed-group organization around mining rents; escalating cross-border attacks prompting retaliatory deployments; sharp macro/climate shocks that overwhelm public-order capacity.