Yemen

It is almost certain that Yemen will remain directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, with the main uncertainty being intensity and geography of escalation rather than whether conflict occurs.

Conflict remains highly likely, with episodic spikes driven by southern power struggles, Houthi-government friction on key fronts, and terrorist attacks in permissive areas. Diplomatic efforts may sustain partial calm, but institutional fragmentation and revenue competition keep incentives for coercion high. Maritime-linked escalation remains a plausible trigger for external strikes and retaliatory cycles affecting Yemen directly.

A partial settlement or durable de-escalation is possible but would likely be uneven and contested, leaving chronic insecurity. The most credible pathway to reduced violence is a package deal linking security arrangements, revenue sharing, and economic stabilization with external guarantees. Absent that, Yemen is likely to experience recurring major fighting, especially around southern governance, energy assets, and strategic corridors.

Security situation Yemen’s baseline is not post-war recovery but an armed, fragmented equilibrium. Frontlines can quiet, yet armed actors retain mobilized forces, parallel institutions, and coercive revenue systems. Recent reporting continues to describe the calm as extremely fragile, with localized clashes, drone attacks, and political-security reshuffles that can rapidly cascade.

Threat drivers The dominant driver is unresolved sovereignty and resource allocation under institutional duplication: competing authorities tax, police, and administer territory, turning governance and finance into conflict arenas. The anti-Houthi camp remains internally divided, and southern secessionist dynamics add a second major fault line that can ignite even without a north-south offensive. Violent extremist networks persist in security vacuums, sustaining chronic kinetic risk. Yemen’s geography also keeps it exposed to regional spillover and maritime-linked escalation, raising the chance that external strikes, interdictions, or proxy signaling translate into direct violence on Yemeni territory.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (pre-mortem) Stabilizers exist: war fatigue, humanitarian dependence, and external patrons’ preference to cap costs can produce tactical de-escalation. Oman- and UN-facilitated diplomacy can freeze some fronts, and local governance support programs can marginally reduce community-level incentives for violence.

Why stabilizers are insufficient These firebreaks do not resolve the core commitment problem: no unified security decision-making, no credible nationwide enforcement, and strong war-economy incentives. Aid disruption and pressure on humanitarian operations can further weaken social buffers and increase coercive competition.

Net assessment Because Yemen is already directly involved in significant armed conflict and the structural drivers of persistence remain intact, continuation and/or renewed escalation is almost certain over the next three years.