United States of America

Medium likelihood (roughly one-in-three) that the United States is directly involved in a significant armed conflict within three years, most plausibly via limited but real combat in the Middle East or an Indo-Pacific crisis, with major-power war still unlikely.

Risk is moderate. The most plausible direct involvement is limited strikes or defensive engagements tied to Middle East escalation and attacks on U.S. forces, plus elevated maritime/air incident risk in the Western Pacific. Russia-NATO direct war remains unlikely absent a major shock. Domestic unrest may be episodically violent but is unlikely to reach civil-war thresholds within one year.

Risk trends upward if multi-theater deterrence strains persist and crisis frequency rises around Taiwan and the Middle East. Firebreaks remain strong, but repeated limited engagements, cyber-kinetic coupling, and alliance tripwires could normalize short combat episodes. A credible regional security architecture, improved deconfliction, and reduced forward exposure would push risk down.

Threat drivers The U.S. remains uniquely exposed because it operates globally, maintains extended deterrence commitments, and routinely conducts maritime/air operations near adversaries. The highest-probability direct-combat pathways remain: Middle East escalation (Iran-Israel dynamics, militia attacks on U.S. forces, Red Sea spillovers) producing U.S. strikes and counterstrikes; and an Indo-Pacific crisis (Taiwan or adjacent maritime/air incident) that forces rapid U.S. decisions under compressed timelines. A secondary but non-trivial pathway is Western Hemisphere coercive action (counter-crime/regime-stability operations) that could generate direct clashes and retaliation.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Structural stabilizers remain strong: favorable geography, large and adaptive economy, deep alliance networks, and professional military command systems. Mutual nuclear vulnerability among major powers continues to discourage intentional escalation to large-scale interstate war and incentivizes signaling, limited aims, and deconfliction. NATO’s deterrence posture and U.S. nuclear survivability underpin a high threshold for direct Russia-NATO war, even amid persistent confrontation.

What changed since the baseline New evidence modestly increases the assessed likelihood of direct involvement by highlighting a denser menu of plausible contingencies and the strain of multi-theater commitments. Expert surveys and risk assessments emphasize higher crisis frequency and the possibility of major-power provocations, while strategy debates underscore overextension and conventional capacity constraints that can weaken deterrence credibility and raise miscalculation risk. Domestic political polarization and episodic political violence elevate background instability, but they are more likely to affect decision-making, readiness, and crisis signaling than to produce civil-war-level conflict within three years.

Net assessment The modal outcome remains managed exposure: episodic, bounded combat operations rather than sustained major war. The main upward risk is a fast-moving incident (attack on U.S. forces, misinterpreted strike, or cyber-kinetic coupling) that triggers retaliation ladders before diplomacy can reassert control.