Uruguay

It is unlikely (around 4%) that Uruguay will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, with risk concentrated in extreme regional rupture scenarios rather than domestic politics.

Very low risk of armed conflict. Expect security policy to remain dominated by anti-trafficking, homicide reduction, and prison management. Cyber incident volume is likely to keep rising, but effects should be disruptive rather than escalatory. Any protests are likely to be episodic and contained; no indicators point to organized armed challengers or interstate crisis dynamics involving Uruguay.

Still low, but more sensitive to external shocks. Watch for sustained militarization of organized crime (heavier weapons, territorial control, systematic attacks on state forces) and for a major regional rupture that forces alignment choices or operational support roles. Even then, Uruguay’s institutional legitimacy, low strategic salience, and Southern Cone firebreaks should keep direct war involvement unlikely.

Threat drivers Uruguay’s main security stressor is organized crime, including its growing role as a transit and logistics node for drug trafficking and associated armed violence. This can elevate homicide rates, prison instability, and attacks on police, but it typically remains criminal rather than politically organized violence. A secondary driver is indirect exposure to wider hemispheric tensions: scenarios such as external military action against Venezuela could increase regional polarization, sanctions enforcement pressures, and maritime/airspace security frictions, but Uruguay is not a frontline state.

Resilience and institutional capacity Uruguay retains high institutional legitimacy, predictable electoral turnover, and stable civil-military relations. These features reduce the probability that insecurity translates into insurgency, coup dynamics, or sustained internal armed conflict. The state’s coercive apparatus is oriented toward policing and rule-of-law support, and the armed forces’ external profile is largely peacekeeping and limited defense modernization rather than expeditionary warfighting.

Systemic firebreaks Geography and strategic position are strong buffers: Uruguay sits between Brazil and Argentina, where incentives for territorial revisionism are minimal and economic interdependence is high. The Southern Cone’s interstate war base rate is low, and Uruguay’s foreign policy tradition emphasizes legalism and multilateralism, lowering escalation risk. Even where cyber and hybrid threats are rising globally, these are more likely to manifest as disruption and espionage than as kinetic conflict involving Uruguay.

Net assessment Compared with the baseline, new evidence reinforces that crime and cyber incidents are the dominant security concerns, not war. A material increase in war risk would require (a) a major regional interstate conflict that pulls in neighbors and forces Uruguay into direct military involvement, or (b) criminal violence evolving into sustained, organized armed confrontation that overwhelms institutions. Both remain low-probability within three years.