Ukraine

It is almost certain that Ukraine will remain directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, driven by the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war and high odds of continued fighting or a fragile ceasefire breakdown.

Fighting is very likely to continue, dominated by attritional ground combat, drone/missile campaigns, and pressure on energy infrastructure. A ceasefire is possible but would likely be partial and fragile; absent credible enforcement and force-separation, the risk of rapid violation and renewed major engagements remains high. Ukraine’s operational resilience should prevent quick defeat, but not end the war.

Uncertainty widens: a frozen conflict with intermittent escalations is plausible, as is a negotiated settlement if credible security arrangements and reconstruction pathways solidify. However, unless deterrence and enforcement mechanisms become robust and durable, the structural risk of renewed major Russia–Ukraine fighting remains high even after any pause. Long-term risk tracks external support durability and Russia’s willingness to accept a stable, sovereign Ukraine.

Security situation Ukraine remains an active theater of high-intensity interstate conflict with Russia, including sustained frontline engagements and long-range missile/drone strikes affecting cities and critical infrastructure. The base rate in an ongoing major war strongly favors continued direct kinetic involvement over a three-year horizon.

Threat drivers Russia’s core war aims (coercing Ukraine’s strategic alignment and consolidating territorial control) remain structurally compatible with prolonged pressure. Path dependence is strong: sunk costs, mobilized forces, wartime economies, and domestic narratives on both sides raise the political price of compromise. Even if negotiations produce a ceasefire, the most likely failure mode is an unstable armistice without robust monitoring, force-separation, and enforcement. Continued strikes on energy and logistics also sustain coercive leverage and can generate escalation cycles.

Resilience and firebreaks Ukraine’s resilience is real: adaptive military learning, societal mobilization, and deepening economic integration with the EU support endurance. External military-financial support remains the decisive resilience pillar; European capacity to sustain assistance even under partial U.S. retrenchment is a stabilizer, though reliance on U.S. strategic enablers is a vulnerability. Institutional legitimacy and cohesion appear sufficient to sustain wartime governance, but persistent governance gaps and corruption risks can erode mobilization efficiency over time.

Pre-mortem (peace by 2029) A peaceful Ukraine by 2029 is plausible only if (a) a ceasefire is paired with credible deterrence-in-depth (fortifications, reserves, air/missile defense), (b) external security commitments are clear enough to deter renewed invasion, and (c) enforcement/monitoring reduces surprise-attack incentives. These stabilizers exist in concept and partial practice, but they are not yet a demonstrated, durable equilibrium.

Net assessment Threat drivers dominate. The most probable futures are continued fighting or a frozen line with periodic major flare-ups. Therefore, direct involvement in significant armed conflict within three years is assessed as extremely likely.