Türkiye

Türkiye faces a roughly one-in-three chance of becoming a direct party to a significant armed conflict within the next three years, with the main pathway being sustained escalation around Syria/Iraq rather than a conventional interstate war.

Most likely: continued bounded counterterrorism and border-zone coercion in Syria/Iraq, with intermittent ISIS/PKK-linked plots and localized clashes. The most meaningful de-escalator would be sustained implementation of a PKK disarmament track. Watch for triggers: mass-casualty attack inside Türkiye, collapse of arrangements around the SDF’s status, or a rapid refugee/energy shock from wider regional war.

Over five years, risk remains structurally elevated due to unresolved northern Syria governance, militia ecosystems, and periodic Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean incidents. A durable PKK demobilization plus stabilized Syria border governance would materially reduce risk. Conversely, a major Iran-centered regional war or a sharp Russia–NATO crisis could raise tail risks, though economic constraints and alliance firebreaks still favor containment.

Scope This estimates the likelihood Türkiye becomes a direct party to significant armed conflict within three years: sustained interstate war or internal conflict reaching civil-war scale. Routine counterterrorism, episodic terrorism, and limited cross-border raids are below-threshold unless they trigger sustained escalation.

Threat drivers Syria–Iraq remains the primary escalation channel. Türkiye’s enduring objective to prevent a PKK/YPG-aligned armed entity near its border sustains coercive leverage and periodic operations. The key structural risk is a breakdown in arrangements governing the SDF’s status and border security that produces sustained multi-actor fighting involving Turkish forces, Syrian regime elements, and/or external patrons.

Militancy and terrorism persist but usually stay sub-threshold. Travel-security advisories and reporting on incidents underscore continued ISIS/PKK-linked threat potential, including the possibility of mass-casualty attacks that could force a larger, longer campaign.

Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea risks are secondary. Military modernization and recurring disputes can raise incident risk, but both sides have strong incentives and alliance-mediated channels to prevent a NATO-internal kinetic spiral. Russia–Ukraine volatility creates exposure, yet Türkiye’s revealed preference remains compartmentalization and mediation under the Montreux framework.

Domestic politics is a tertiary pathway. Governance deterioration and polarization can drive unrest and heavy-handed policing, but there is limited evidence of security-force fragmentation or rival armed centers consistent with civil-war onset.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Türkiye retains high-capacity intelligence, internal security, and a large combat-experienced military, supporting containment. NATO membership, deconfliction habits, and the Montreux regime reduce accidental escalation in the Black Sea and Aegean. Economic fragility, sanctions/finance sensitivity, and trade/tourism dependence create strong incentives to avoid prolonged high-intensity war.

Net assessment New evidence modestly improves the internal-conflict outlook via indications of a PKK disarmament process, while not removing the core Syria-border escalation risk. Overall risk stays elevated but not trending toward deliberate major interstate war; the modal outcome remains bounded operations with episodic crises.