Chad

Chad is more likely than not to face localized armed clashes and border incidents, but a sustained, nationwide war or major interstate conflict remains less likely than continued contained violence through 2029.

Most likely: continued localized violence (farmer-herder and intercommunal clashes), periodic militant attacks in the Lake Chad Basin, and heightened eastern-border incidents tied to Sudan. Key watch items: additional cross-border strikes/incursions, major opposition crackdowns that trigger armed reprisals, or signs of rebel regrouping in the north/east. Regime stability in N’Djamena remains the modal outcome.

If Sudan’s war persists or fragments further, Chad’s eastern periphery faces a higher chance of sustained armed activity and deeper militarization of local conflicts. Over five years, the main structural risk is political succession/legitimacy stress under an increasingly personalized system, which could raise the probability of elite splits. Conversely, durable border management and a political opening would materially reduce escalation risk.

Risk definition This assesses the chance Chad is directly involved in significant armed conflict within three years, including sustained internal fighting or repeated cross-border kinetic engagements.

Threat drivers Sudan’s war is the dominant external accelerant: large refugee inflows, arms flows, and armed actor proximity raise the odds of border firefights and miscalculation. Reported RSF-linked incursions and fatalities among Chadian soldiers indicate the border can already generate direct kinetic events. Internally, political closure has deepened after the 2024 election cycle: constitutional changes extending tenure, arrests and long sentences for key opposition figures, and repression increase the risk that dissent shifts from street protest to armed mobilization or that peripheral elites hedge with violence. Separately, chronic insecurity persists in the Lake Chad Basin from Boko Haram/ISWAP-linked activity and in border peripheries where non-state armed groups and trafficking networks operate. Climate and land pressures amplify farmer-herder and intercommunal violence, which can become militarized when politicized or when security forces intervene unevenly.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Chad’s core stabilizer is the regime’s security apparatus and patronage-based elite cohesion, which historically contains challenges in the capital and key corridors even when peripheries burn. N’Djamena’s declared neutrality in Sudan reflects a strong preference to avoid entanglement that could threaten regime survival. Bilateral and regional security cooperation (border coordination with Libya; counterterrorism diplomacy; MNJTF legacy structures) provides some operational buffering, even if uneven. International attention tied to refugees and counterterrorism also raises the cost of a full breakdown.

Net assessment The most probable pathway is continued “managed insecurity”: episodic rebel/armed group clashes, communal violence, and intermittent Sudan-border incidents. The less likely but consequential tail risk is a northern/eastern rebel coalition gaining external sanctuary and triggering a sustained campaign, or a regime crisis that fractures security elites. Overall risk is meaningfully elevated versus a stable baseline, but still below a 50% threshold for major, sustained war because coercive capacity and elite incentives favor containment.