Sweden

Sweden’s direct involvement in significant armed conflict in the next three years is unlikely, but there is a roughly one-in-eight chance driven mainly by spillover from a wider NATO–Russia crisis in the Baltic region.

Sweden will likely deepen NATO force integration, expand host-nation support, and harden protection for ports, airbases, and undersea infrastructure. The armed-attack risk remains low, but hybrid activity, intelligence operations, and cyber pressure will likely persist. The most plausible kinetic pathway is a limited air or maritime incident in the Baltic during a period of heightened NATO–Russia tension.

If Russia regenerates conventional capacity and posture toward the Baltic after a Ukraine de-escalation, Sweden’s exposure as a logistics and operating hub will rise. Offsetting this, Sweden’s total-defence expansion and Nordic–NATO operational integration should strengthen deterrence and crisis management. War remains unlikely, but tail risk increases if US commitment weakens or Baltic incidents become frequent and politicized.

Scope and definition This estimates the probability of sustained kinetic conflict involving Swedish territory, forces, or critical infrastructure within three years. It excludes routine NATO activity, espionage, cyber operations, sabotage, terrorism, and organized crime unless they plausibly trigger interstate kinetic escalation.

Threat drivers Alliance exposure is structurally higher after NATO accession. Sweden’s geography, ports, airbases, and Gotland’s operational value make it a key enabling area for Baltic reinforcement, ISR, and air and maritime operations. This increases the chance Sweden is drawn in early if a wider NATO–Russia crisis turns kinetic, even if Sweden is not the initial target. Baltic Sea close-contact dynamics remain the most plausible kinetic trigger: air and maritime incidents, miscalculation around exercises and transits, or escalation following ambiguous attacks on undersea or energy/communications infrastructure. These scenarios are low-probability but high-consequence because attribution can be contested and political decision time is short. Russia remains the dominant external driver in Swedish threat framing, with emphasis on intelligence activity, influence operations, technology acquisition, and sabotage risk. A stabilization in Ukraine could, over time, allow Russian reconstitution and renewed pressure in the Baltic theater, modestly raising tail risk within the three-year window. Domestic terrorism and organized crime are elevated security concerns, but they are not, by themselves, strong pathways to interstate war. Their relevance is mainly indirect: they can strain internal security capacity, amplify societal polarization, or be exploited in narratives during a crisis.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Collective defence is the primary firebreak. NATO membership raises expected costs of overt attack and incentivizes adversaries toward deniable tools rather than sustained kinetic action. Sweden’s total-defence build-out, host-nation support planning, and civil preparedness improve continuity of government and crisis management, reducing the likelihood that ambiguous incidents spiral. High institutional quality, social trust, and strong governance indicators support mobilization capacity and policy coherence under stress.

Net assessment New evidence largely reinforces the baseline: Swedish official channels continue to assess armed-attack risk as low while warning of serious hybrid threats and potential deterioration. The three-year kinetic risk is still driven primarily by wider NATO–Russia crisis dynamics and Baltic incident escalation rather than Sweden-specific incentives for war.