South Sudan

It is very likely (around 85%) that South Sudan will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, primarily through renewed large-scale internal fighting with a secondary risk of border/proxy incidents linked to Sudan’s war.

Violence is very likely to remain elevated with episodic intensification in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, and parts of Equatoria. Political brinkmanship around the transition and security leadership reshuffles will keep defection and retaliation risks high. UNMISS constraints reduce response speed, increasing the chance that localized clashes become sustained campaigns. Border spillover from Sudan will continue to raise incident risk in northern corridors.

Absent a renegotiated settlement with enforceable security guarantees and real force integration, South Sudan is likely to remain in a high-violence equilibrium: fragmented conflict, predation around oil and trade corridors, and periodic political crises around elections and succession. If Sudan’s war persists, cross-border armed networks and refugee pressures will keep proxy and border-incident risks elevated even if Juba avoids formal interstate war.

Scope This estimates the likelihood of South Sudan’s direct involvement in significant armed conflict through 2029: sustained fighting among organized armed actors on South Sudanese territory, plus interstate/proxy kinetic incidents involving South Sudanese forces in border and oil corridors.

Threat drivers The central driver is a failing elite bargain under the R-ARCSS. Repeated transition extensions, stalled security arrangements, and continued parallel command structures keep incentives aligned toward hedging, pre-emption, and coercive consolidation rather than demobilization. Recent reporting points to intensified confrontations in key states, large-scale displacement, and heightened political tensions tied to arrests and pressure on opposition leadership, consistent with a shift from managed competition to open contestation.

Violence remains easily “nationalized.” Communal armed youth and local militias provide mobilizable manpower and plausible deniability; once state and opposition forces intervene, localized disputes can become organized campaigns. Fiscal fragility and predation around oil revenues, trade routes, and subnational administrations further reward armed entrepreneurship and defections.

External spillover from Sudan remains a major escalation channel. Sudan’s war sustains refugee inflows, arms diffusion, and cross-border armed networks, raising the chance of incidents in contested borderlands and oil-linked corridors even if Juba seeks formal neutrality.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (pre-mortem stabilizers) Elites retain strong incentives to avoid a decisive nationwide war that could disrupt oil income and trigger sharper regional and international penalties. Limited infrastructure and logistics often cap the tempo and geographic reach of offensives, keeping violence episodic and fragmented.

UNMISS presence, sanctions/arms embargo constraints, and regional mediation (IGAD/AU) still provide partial firebreaks. However, operational constraints, access frictions, and reduced mobility weaken deterrence and civilian protection, increasing the probability that local escalations run longer before being frozen.

Net assessment New evidence since the baseline reinforces, rather than reduces, the assessment that the transition framework is functionally defunct and that conflict intensity is rising. The modal pathway is renewed significant internal armed conflict; a smaller but material tail risk persists for cross-border/proxy kinetic incidents driven by Sudan’s war dynamics.