Somalia

It is almost certain that Somalia will remain directly involved in significant armed conflict through 2029, driven by a durable al-Shabaab insurgency, episodic high-impact terrorism, and persistent localized armed violence despite ongoing international support.

Conflict remains almost certain. Expect continued al-Shabaab attacks (IEDs, complex assaults, indirect fire) and sustained fighting in south-central regions, with localized offensives and reversals. Key swing factors: AUSSOM/UN enabling support reliability; whether constitutional and electoral disputes further fragment security coordination; and the pace at which cleared areas receive durable policing, justice, and basic administration.

A violent stalemate remains the modal outcome: the state holds major cities and key corridors while al-Shabaab retains rural influence and terrorism capacity. Upside path: a durable federal bargain plus predictable security financing and professionalization that enables “hold and govern.” Downside path: compounded political rupture, mission underfunding, and sovereignty shocks around Somaliland that widen fragmentation and increase localized armed clashes.

Security situation Somalia’s baseline remains active intrastate armed conflict: the federal government and partner forces versus al-Shabaab, with an additional ISIS-Somalia node (notably in Puntland), plus recurrent clan and local militia violence. Mogadishu is generally held by the state but remains vulnerable to complex attacks and indirect fire.

Threat drivers The dominant driver is al-Shabaab’s resilient insurgent system: coercive rural governance, taxation/extortion, intelligence penetration, and the ability to regenerate after offensives. Recent reporting continues to align with a structural “clear outpaces hold” problem, creating recurring recapture risk and a persistent terrorism campaign even when the state achieves tactical gains.

A second driver is political fragmentation and contested constitutional/electoral pathways. Visible parliamentary disorder and federal–member state tensions increase the risk of security-sector distraction, parallel authority dynamics, and reduced operational coordination against insurgents.

A third driver is external and regional friction around Somaliland and Gulf/Horn alignments. Recognition and port/security deal disputes raise sovereignty salience and can trigger localized clashes, coercive posturing, or proxy-style competition. However, these dynamics are more likely to add episodic flare-ups than to produce a conventional interstate war.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (pre-mortem) A “peace holds” pathway would require: predictable financing and logistics for AUSSOM/UN enabling support; improved SNA payroll integrity, command-and-control, and territorial policing; and a credible federal bargain on elections and revenue/fiscal federalism. Firebreaks include strong international preference for containment, continued counterterrorism pressure, and Somalia’s incentives to sustain reform tied to external assistance and regional integration.

Net assessment New evidence does not indicate structural de-escalation. The modal 2026–2029 outcome remains a violent stalemate with periodic offensives, localized reversals, and recurring high-impact attacks. The probability of significant armed conflict remains extremely high even if frontlines shift and some areas stabilize temporarily.