Senegal

Unlikely: Senegal has an estimated 20% chance of becoming directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, with risk concentrated in eastern-border spillover and a smaller tail risk of severe political crisis escalating beyond unrest.

Most plausible developments are localized security incidents tied to Sahel spillover risk (attempted infiltration, arrests, or brief cross-border pursuit dynamics near the Mali frontier) and episodic urban unrest driven by fiscal stress and youth grievances. The cyberattack increases administrative disruption and mistrust risk but is unlikely to translate into armed conflict without organized armed mobilization or security-force splintering.

Risk rises if western Mali’s militant ecosystem consolidates durable logistics and coercive influence near Senegal’s border departments, repeatedly probes Senegalese territory, or fuses with trafficking networks inside Senegal. Offsets include sustained professionalism of the armed forces and gendarmerie, continued external security cooperation despite reduced basing, and successful economic management that reduces protest-to-violence escalation incentives.

Scope Significant armed conflict means sustained, organized fighting involving Senegalese forces (interstate) or an internal insurgency with durable armed organization and territorial contestation. Terrorism, riots, and cyber incidents matter insofar as they plausibly evolve into sustained warfare.

Threat drivers Sahel spillover remains the primary channel. Regional assessments describe rising militant operational capacity (including more complex attacks and pressure on logistics corridors) and continued deterioration in Mali/Burkina/Niger. The most plausible Senegal pathway is episodic infiltration/ambush risk and disruption along the Mali frontier and key road corridors, not a durable internal front. Domestic instability is the secondary channel. Recent university protests and a protest-related death highlight persistent youth-economic pressure and policing flashpoints. However, current indicators still align with episodic urban unrest rather than security-force fragmentation, armed-group consolidation, or territorial contestation. Casamance remains a residual localized risk: sporadic violence/criminality can persist, and peace implementation can be fiscally constrained, but available signals still point to containment. Cyber disruption is rising. The reported ransomware incident affecting the national ID directorate is serious for state capacity and trust, yet it is better treated as a governance and continuity risk than a direct driver of armed conflict absent linkage to organized armed mobilization.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Senegal retains comparatively professional, cohesive security forces under civilian control, with strong gendarmerie/internal security capacity. Dense civic, religious, and associational mediation networks historically reduce escalation and provide off-ramps during political crises. Externally, the drawdown of permanent foreign basing does not imply isolation; Senegal continues security cooperation, training links, and regional coordination, including border-focused collaboration.

Net assessment New evidence reinforces regional deterioration and highlights governance stressors (protests, cyberattack), increasing the likelihood of incidents and coercive policing episodes. It still does not show prerequisites for sustained internal war or interstate conflict. Maintain 20% (Unlikely).