Sudan

Almost certain: Sudan will remain directly involved in significant armed conflict over the next three years, with only a narrow chance of a sustained nationwide cessation of hostilities by 2029.

Significant armed conflict is almost certain. Expect continued high-intensity fighting in Darfur and Kordofan, persistent drone/airstrike activity, and further deterioration of civilian protection and food security in contested and besieged areas. Any ceasefire is likely to be localized, temporary, and frequently violated absent credible monitoring and constraints on external resupply and war financing.

Risk remains extremely high. Even if one side gains advantage or a political deal is signed, the modal outcome is a fragmented security order with autonomous commanders, militia/criminal violence, and periodic offensives. Spillover and border incidents with Chad and instability linked to South Sudan corridors are likely to persist unless external support networks and war-economy revenues are durably disrupted.

Security situation Sudan remains in an active, large-scale civil war centered on SAF–RSF competition, with expanding and shifting fronts in Darfur, Kordofan, and increasingly sensitive border-adjacent areas. Remote-strike capacity (drones, air and artillery) sustains lethality and enables continued operations even under logistical stress. Humanitarian collapse and siege dynamics further harden incentives for predation and territorial control.

Threat drivers (raise risk) Command fragmentation and militia autonomy reduce the odds that any top-level deal translates into compliance on the ground. The war economy (gold, checkpoints, smuggling, coercive taxation) continues to fund force generation and rewards continued violence. External political and material backing for belligerents sustains operational tempo and reduces the pressure to compromise. Border spillover risk is rising: insecurity along the Darfur–Chad corridor and incidents involving Chadian forces increase the chance of cross-border clashes, while instability in South Sudan and contested corridors raise risks around refugee flows, armed group movement, and critical infrastructure.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (lower risk) A “peace holds by 2029” pathway exists but is narrow: mutual exhaustion, localized stalemates, and neighbors’ preference to avoid overt interstate war can cap escalation. Sanctions designations and diplomatic pressure can marginally constrain financing and travel of key actors. SAF’s partial administrative continuity in areas it holds can preserve limited state functions and enable localized security bargains.

Net assessment (2026–2029) New evidence does not reduce the baseline; it reinforces persistence. Reports of worsening security in Darfur and Kordofan, continued civilian harm, and expanding fronts outweigh indications of incremental SAF momentum. The most likely trajectory is continued major armed conflict with episodic offensives, localized ceasefires that fail to generalize, and periodic cross-border security incidents rather than a durable nationwide settlement within three years.