Russia

It is almost certain that Russia will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, driven primarily by the ongoing war against Ukraine and persistent cross-border strike dynamics even under any ceasefire scenario.

Russia is almost certain to remain in significant armed conflict linked to Ukraine, including continued ground fighting and long-range strikes. A ceasefire attempt is plausible but more likely to be militarized and fragile than self-enforcing, with persistent violations and periodic flare-ups. Direct Russia–NATO kinetic war remains unlikely; the main escalation pathways are micro-incidents tied to hybrid activity and retaliation dynamics.

Beyond three years, the most likely trajectory is either a frozen but violent armistice with recurring strikes and raids, or a partial settlement that reduces intensity while leaving a heavily militarized frontier. If intensity drops, Russia may reconstitute forces and expand coercive pressure on neighbors, but NATO deterrence and escalation-control incentives still weigh against deliberate large-scale war with the alliance. Ukraine-linked armed incidents remain the dominant risk driver.

Scope and base rate This is a persistence assessment: whether Russia will be a direct participant in significant armed conflict through the next three years. The base rate is dominated by Russia’s continuing large-scale war against Ukraine, including sustained ground combat and long-range strike exchanges.

Threat drivers Ukraine remains the central driver. Reporting across 2025–2026 continues to indicate active operations along multiple axes and a pattern of cross-border attacks and retaliation affecting Russian border regions. Even if frontlines stabilize, drones, missiles, and sabotage dynamics make “direct involvement” highly sticky.

A secondary driver is escalation risk around NATO’s periphery via hybrid activity. European sanctions actions and analytical reporting describe persistent Russian information operations, cyber activity, and sabotage attempts against critical infrastructure. These raise the frequency of dangerous micro-incidents and retaliation cycles, but most pathways still remain below the threshold of deliberate Russia–NATO conventional war.

Domestic security pressures (terrorism risk and internal coercive governance) can harden threat perceptions and reduce political space for compromise, indirectly sustaining a wartime posture.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (pre-mortem: why peace could hold) The strongest firebreak remains nuclear deterrence and mutual incentives to avoid direct Russia–NATO kinetic war. Russia’s conventional capacity is heavily absorbed by Ukraine and shaped by attrition and force-generation constraints, limiting bandwidth for a second major conventional front.

Russia’s external economic and diplomatic adaptation, including deeper non-Western ties and trade arrangements, can sustain the war effort while also incentivizing escalation control to avoid catastrophic confrontation and additional sanctions.

Net assessment New evidence does not materially reduce the baseline risk. The modal path remains continued Ukraine-linked combat and strike activity. A ceasefire is plausible, but the most likely form is fragile and militarized, with recurring violations and continued long-range attacks. Therefore, Russia’s direct involvement in significant armed conflict within three years remains almost certain.