Paraguay

Unlikely: Paraguay has a low probability of direct involvement in significant armed conflict within the next three years, with risks concentrated in localized criminal violence and low-level insurgent activity rather than war-scale fighting.

Criminal violence and trafficking-linked killings remain the dominant risk, especially in border departments and the Tri-Border Area. Protests (for example around fiscal reforms) may prompt heavy policing and isolated clashes but are unlikely to become sustained armed confrontation. EPP activity should remain sporadic and localized. Cyber incidents and data leaks are a growing destabilizer but are more likely to produce disruption and political friction than armed conflict.

Risk could edge up if prison governance failures and corruption enable more cohesive armed criminal structures, increasing the lethality and frequency of state–gang firefights. Even in that scenario, the modal outcome is persistent insecurity rather than civil war. Interstate war remains structurally unlikely; the main tail risk is a major regional crisis that drives sharper polarization, cross-border security incidents, and intensified cyber/disinformation campaigns tied to Paraguay’s external partnerships.

Net assessment Paraguay’s most plausible security trajectory through 2029 is continued chronic criminal violence with episodic armed clashes during policing and border operations, not sustained large-scale combat. The baseline remains intact: threat drivers have not structurally shifted toward civil war or interstate war.

Threat drivers The Tri-Border Area and northeastern departments remain exposed to transnational illicit markets (drugs, arms, smuggling) enabled by corruption and porous borders. The EPP persists as a niche actor capable of kidnappings and sporadic attacks, but available indicators still imply limited manpower, logistics, and ability to seize/hold territory. Cyber risk is rising (major data breaches, extortion, and allegations of foreign-linked intrusions), which can amplify political distrust and operational disruption, but cyber pressure alone is more likely to remain below the threshold of armed conflict.

Interstate and external entanglement Paraguay has no active territorial flashpoint with neighbors, and South America’s strong norm against interstate war remains a systemic firebreak. Defense cooperation with the United States and counter-terror finance designations increase geopolitical signaling and may attract disinformation or cyber attention, yet they do not create a credible pathway to Paraguayan participation in external kinetic campaigns. Regional tail risk comes mainly from a wider U.S.–Venezuela escalation environment that could raise polarization and cyber spillovers, not from direct Paraguayan combat involvement.

Resilience and firebreaks Macro-financial stability and trade dependence raise the opportunity cost of escalation for elites. Governance indicators show persistent institutional weaknesses (corruption, limited investigative capacity), but not a collapse dynamic. Security forces can contain localized threats unevenly; the more realistic failure mode is continued impunity and localized violence rather than state loss of territorial control.

Signposts to watch Prison/gang consolidation into more coherent armed structures; sustained uptick in complex attacks on security forces; politicized security-force fragmentation; or a regional crisis that triggers cross-border militarization beyond routine joint controls.