Oman

Oman is unlikely to be directly involved in significant armed conflict in the next three years, with risk concentrated in low-probability regional spillover scenarios from Iran-related escalation or Yemen-border incidents.

Oman is very likely to remain stable and avoid direct conflict over the next year. The most plausible shocks are disruption without war: elevated maritime risk and insurance costs in nearby sea lanes, temporary airspace/flight interruptions during regional crises, and occasional Yemen-border interdictions against smuggling. A direct kinetic incident is possible but would most likely be brief, defensive, and quickly de-escalated.

Over five years, Oman’s exposure to Hormuz and Yemen persists, making episodic incidents and disruption more likely than war. Neutrality and mediator value should continue to reduce entrapment risk, but Oman’s expanding logistics role and foreign access arrangements can increase collateral exposure in a high-intensity regional conflict. Risk rises if Iran–US/Israel confrontation becomes sustained and normalizes strikes or mining near Omani approaches.

Bottom line Oman’s modal 2026–2029 outcome remains stability and non-belligerence. New evidence largely reinforces resilience (economic buffers and active de-escalatory diplomacy) rather than adding endogenous conflict drivers.

Threat drivers Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman remain the dominant structural exposure. If regional escalation intensifies, Oman could face maritime disruption (mining, drone/missile spillover, misidentification incidents), airspace interruptions, or collateral damage near critical ports and sea lanes. Oman’s growing logistics relevance and foreign access arrangements increase operational proximity to partners, which can marginally raise targeting or miscalculation risk in a high-intensity regional war, but do not create automatic entrapment. Yemen remains the second vector. Border areas near Dhofar face persistent risks from smuggling networks and episodic armed activity on the Yemeni side. A contained clash during interdiction or a cross-border projectile/drone incident is plausible in a deterioration scenario, but sustained cross-border warfare remains a tail risk. Domestic armed conflict risk remains low. Oman’s security services are capable, and available terrorism reporting supports a low baseline of organized militant activity; the more realistic domestic risk is isolated attacks rather than an insurgency.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Oman’s strongest firebreak is its long-standing neutral, mediator posture, which preserves communication channels across rival blocs and reduces incentives for deliberate targeting. State capacity for internal security and border management is comparatively strong. Macro-financial resilience has improved: IMF assessments emphasize robust fiscal and external positions, declining debt, low inflation, and reform momentum under Vision 2040, lowering the probability that economic stress catalyzes destabilizing violence.

Net assessment (3 years) Estimated probability of direct involvement in significant armed conflict: 14% (Kent: unlikely). If realized, it is most likely brief, defensive, and geographically constrained (maritime/air incident or limited border event) driven by regional escalation rather than Omani initiative.