Niger

It is highly likely that Niger will remain directly involved in significant armed conflict over the next three years, driven primarily by entrenched jihadist insurgencies and cross-border militant mobility, with a lower-probability tail risk of limited interstate clashes via miscalculation.

Conflict is likely to remain intense in Tillabéri and parts of Tahoua, with continued IED/ambush risk on main supply routes and periodic mass-casualty attacks on villages. The Niamey airport/base incident suggests militants can probe high-value targets, increasing episodic capital-area shocks without implying imminent regime collapse. Nigeria–Niger diplomacy likely reduces sustained border escalation, but localized incidents remain plausible.

Absent major improvements in intelligence, logistics, and civilian-protection performance, Niger is likely to face a protracted insurgency with shifting hotspots and intermittent expansion toward strategic corridors and infrastructure. AES cooperation may improve tactical responsiveness but is unlikely to deliver durable territorial control on its own. Interstate war remains unlikely, but the risk of limited cross-border clashes persists if regional polarization and attribution disputes intensify.

Security Situation Niger’s three-year baseline is continued significant armed conflict. Western Niger (Tillabéri–Tahoua) remains a core theater of asymmetric warfare with recurring mass-casualty violence against civilians and sustained IED/ambush patterns on key axes. The southeast (Diffa/Lake Chad Basin) remains exposed to militant and criminal networks, with added strain from reduced regional task-force integration.

Threat Drivers Cross-border sanctuary and mobility from Mali and Burkina Faso continue to enable raid-and-exfiltrate operations, coercion of rural communities, and disruption of markets and administration. The conflict is structurally self-sustaining: militants exploit lightly governed spaces, local protection deficits, and predictable security-force movement.

A second driver is institutional and partnership degradation after the 2023 coup. The loss of prior Western intelligence/ISR enablers and broader regional frameworks reduces targeting quality and persistence. New security alignments (AES cooperation and Russian support) may improve regime protection and enable episodic sweeps, but they are unlikely to generate durable area control without logistics depth, disciplined civilian-protection practices, and accountable governance.

A third driver is political hardening and militia-style mobilization dynamics. Expanded civilian recruitment can increase manpower but also raises risks of abuse, communal retaliation, and grievance-based recruitment for insurgents.

Resilience and Systemic Firebreaks (Pre-mortem Stabilizers) The regime retains coercive control of Niamey and major garrisons, can surge forces to defend strategic nodes, and has strong incentives to avoid elective interstate war given fiscal limits and trade dependence. Diplomatic engagement with Nigeria provides a partial deconfliction channel that can cap escalation.

Interstate Escalation Risk Check Rhetorical escalation (including claims of foreign sponsorship of attacks) increases miscalculation risk, but structural constraints and mutual border-security interests still favor containment over sustained interstate war.

Net Assessment Because Niger is already in a high-intensity insurgency ecosystem with cross-border drivers and weakened counterinsurgency enablers, the most likely outcome is continued significant armed conflict through 2029; interstate conflict remains a secondary tail risk.