Myanmar

It is almost certain that Myanmar will remain directly involved in significant armed conflict through the next three years, with persistence more likely than a decisive settlement and a non-trivial risk of further fragmentation and episodic escalation.

Fighting is almost certain to continue across multiple theaters, with the regime leaning on airpower, emergency rule, and conscription while attempting to secure core cities and key corridors. China-brokered or neighbor-facilitated pauses may recur in select border areas, but they are likely to be temporary and geographically bounded. The main near-term risk is sharp escalation around strategic hubs (Rakhine littoral, northern Shan corridors, Mandalay approaches) rather than nationwide de-escalation.

A durable nationwide settlement remains possible but requires a credible federal bargain and enforceable security arrangements that currently lack a unifying political center. More plausible is a protracted, uneven conflict with de facto autonomous zones, intermittent ceasefires, and periodic offensives as actors compete over revenue and administration. Interstate war remains less likely than internal fragmentation, though border incidents and spillovers will persist as neighbors prioritize containment and corridor security.

Security Situation Myanmar remains in sustained, geographically widespread armed conflict involving the SAC/Tatmadaw, NUG-aligned PDFs, and multiple EAOs. The conflict is no longer a single center-periphery insurgency pattern; it is a polycentric contest over territory, corridors, revenue, and local administration, with frequent air and artillery use by the regime and expanding drone-enabled operations by resistance forces.

Threat Drivers The core driver remains a sovereignty and legitimacy rupture after the 2021 coup. The regime’s reliance on emergency rule, coercion, and managed electoral sequencing is more likely to harden resistance than to restore consent-based governance. Fragmentation among anti-regime actors reduces prospects for a unified negotiating position, while the growth of conflict economies and criminal-border ecosystems increases the number of stakeholders with incentives to prolong insecurity. Battlefield dynamics also incentivize continued operations: the regime seeks to prevent strategic encirclement of key cities and corridors; EAOs/PDFs seek to consolidate gains and deny regime mobility.

Resilience and Firebreaks (Pre-mortem: why peace could hold) A “peace by 2029” pathway would require (a) a credible, enforceable ceasefire architecture with monitoring and revenue arrangements, (b) a political bargain on federalism/power-sharing acceptable to major EAOs and Bamar resistance, and (c) external guarantors aligning behind de-escalation. Some stabilizers exist: conflict fatigue, logistical and manpower constraints, and China’s preference for border stability and de-escalation. However, these factors more plausibly produce localized pauses than a nationwide settlement.

External Environment Myanmar has limited alliance entanglements that would mechanically pull it into interstate war. China and Russia provide varying degrees of diplomatic and material support to the regime, but Beijing’s dominant interest is containment and corridor security, not open-ended escalation. Neighboring states largely manage spillovers through border security and ad hoc diplomacy, reducing interstate-war probability even as internal war persists.

Net Assessment Continuation of significant armed conflict is extremely likely. The main uncertainty is intensity and geography: partial ceasefires may emerge in select border theaters, but the structural drivers of nationwide conflict and fragmentation remain intact.