Mali

It is almost certain that Mali will remain directly involved in significant armed conflict over the next three years, driven by persistent jihadist insurgency, state counter-operations, and widening economic-warfare tactics against key corridors and cities.

Conflict remains high-tempo with a strong chance of further corridor interdictions, convoy attacks, and localized sieges, including in areas previously viewed as comparatively safer in the west. The most likely pattern is tactical FAMa successes (often drone-enabled) followed by insurgent adaptation and renewed pressure on roads, fuel, and secondary towns. Bamako faces elevated disruption risk but not a base-case fall.

Absent a credible political settlement and improved civilian-protection governance, Mali is likely to remain in a protracted insurgency with shifting frontlines and periodic economic blockades. AES cooperation and external security assistance may prevent outright regime collapse, but are unlikely to deliver decisive victory. A meaningful downshift in violence would require reopening political space, negotiated local arrangements, and sustained restoration of services beyond garrison towns.

Security situation Mali continues to meet the threshold for significant armed conflict. Violence is not confined to the north/center; reporting indicates intensified pressure on western regions and strategic routes, including convoy ambushes and blockades that directly affect Bamako’s lifelines. The post-MINUSMA environment leaves fewer external buffers and less independent monitoring, increasing volatility and miscalculation risk.

Threat drivers The dominant driver remains resilient jihadist insurgency (JNIM and ISGS) embedded in local conflict economies and cross-border sanctuaries. A notable evolution is the use of economic warfare: sieges, fuel-route interdiction, and sabotage of infrastructure to erode state legitimacy and constrain FAMa mobility. Political closure under the junta, repression of opposition, and reported abuses by state/auxiliary forces increase grievance-based recruitment and local retaliation dynamics, sustaining an insurgency-friendly ecology.

Resilience and firebreaks (pre-mortem stabilizers) Mali’s stabilizers are limited but real: the state retains decisive control of Bamako and key garrisons; FAMa has increased investment, drones and partner-enabled strike capacity can deliver tactical disruption; and AES security cooperation plus pragmatic bilateral ties (notably with neighbors and selective external intelligence engagement) can reduce some corridor risks. These factors can prevent rapid state collapse and may produce localized improvements.

Net assessment Stabilizers are insufficient to offset structural drivers. The conflict is likely to persist as protracted asymmetric warfare with periodic surges, including around supply corridors (RN1/Kayes axis) and contested towns. Interstate war is not the base case, but Algeria-Mali friction and cross-border pursuit dynamics marginally raise escalation risk. Overall probability remains very high and is revised upward slightly due to credible indications of widening blockades and strategic pressure on national logistics.