North Macedonia

North Macedonia is unlikely to be directly involved in significant armed conflict in the next three years; the main tail risk is regional spillover coinciding with a domestic legitimacy shock.

Most likely: protests and blockades tied to governance, economic grievances, or administrative changes, with contained public-order incidents. Border disruptions (e.g., hauliers) may recur and create diplomatic friction without military escalation. Watch for: sustained mass unrest plus heavy-handed policing, interethnic mobilisation, or a serious Kosovo-adjacent security incident that strains border control and domestic politics.

If EU accession remains stalled and anti-corruption reforms underperform, legitimacy erosion could increase polarisation and vulnerability to hybrid interference, raising the chance of violent unrest. Even then, NATO deterrence and Ohrid power-sharing remain strong firebreaks against civil war or interstate conflict. A step-change in risk would most plausibly follow a major regional conflict shock combined with security-sector politicisation or breakdown of interethnic elite bargaining.

Scope This estimates the likelihood of North Macedonia’s direct involvement in significant armed conflict (interstate war or sustained organized internal violence) through early 2029. New evidence mostly reinforces continuity: political volatility and corruption allegations persist, while alliance deterrence and interethnic firebreaks remain intact.

Threat drivers Domestic legitimacy stress: reporting and commentary point to persistent corruption cases, polarised politics, and governance capacity gaps. These conditions can generate protests, road blockades, and localized clashes with police, but they do not by themselves create an armed-conflict pathway absent organized armed groups, territorial control, or security-force splintering.

Regional spillover exposure: the dominant tail risk remains a Western Balkans security shock (especially Kosovo–Serbia) producing refugee flows, trafficking, and nationalist mobilisation. North Macedonia’s borders and transit role increase exposure; however, its incentives favor containment and de-escalation.

Hybrid/cyber and external pressure: cyber incidents and influence activity are best treated as amplifiers of political crisis rather than direct triggers of kinetic conflict. Diplomatic frictions with Russia (tit-for-tat expulsions) signal alignment costs but do not materially raise interstate war risk.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Alliance deterrence: NATO membership sharply reduces the probability of external attack and constrains escalation dynamics.

Interethnic settlement: interethnic relations are assessed as stable and the Ohrid Framework Agreement continues to structure elite incentives, lowering civil-war risk.

State capacity and external anchoring: functional policing and border-management cooperation, plus deepening economic/security ties with the US and UK and energy diversification projects, modestly strengthen crisis resilience.

Net judgment Expect political turbulence, corruption-driven distrust, and episodic public-order incidents, but significant armed conflict remains unlikely. A material risk increase would most plausibly require a major regional conflict shock coinciding with a domestic legitimacy rupture that politicises security services and destabilises interethnic elite bargains.