Moldova

Moldova’s direct involvement in significant armed conflict in the next three years is unlikely but plausible (roughly a one-in-five chance), mainly via spillover or a Transnistria-related escalation tied to the Russia–Ukraine war.

Most likely: continued hybrid pressure (disinformation, financing, cyber), episodic airspace/drone incidents linked to the Ukraine war, and political friction around elections and regional autonomy issues, without sustained combat. Key swing factors: a major incident causing fatalities, a sharp escalation around Odesa, or a Transnistria provocation that triggers armed clashes before de-escalation mechanisms engage.

Over five years, kinetic risk tracks the Russia–Ukraine end-state and Moldova’s internal governance trajectory. Deeper EU integration, energy decoupling, and gradual defense modernization would lower the probability of armed conflict, though hybrid coercion persists. Conversely, a prolonged regional war with intensified Black Sea/southern Ukraine operations, or severe domestic institutional crisis, would raise the chance that a localized incident escalates into sustained fighting.

Security situation Moldova sits adjacent to an active major war and hosts a long-running frozen conflict in Transnistria with a Russian military footprint. The dominant risk is not a planned conventional campaign against Moldova, but localized escalation triggered by spillover (drones/missiles, border incidents) or a manufactured/accidental security event around Transnistria that becomes politically hard to contain.

Threat drivers The Russia–Ukraine war sustains elevated background risk, including airspace violations and debris/drone incidents that can cause casualties, domestic pressure, and rapid crisis dynamics. Transnistria remains a structural vulnerability: it offers opportunities for coercion, provocation, and ambiguity, especially if regional fighting intensifies near Odesa. Hybrid interference is persistent and well-resourced, targeting elections, governance legitimacy, and social cohesion; while hybrid activity is not itself “armed conflict,” it can raise the frequency of crises and miscalculation risk.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Moldova’s non-NATO status reduces alliance-entanglement incentives for adversaries to “test” collective defense, and Chisinau’s revealed preference is to manage incidents through diplomacy and incremental capability-building rather than escalation. EU economic anchoring is deepening (trade dependence and targeted sanctions tools against destabilizers), and partner support is increasingly oriented toward energy resilience, cyber defense, and institutional hardening. Moldova is also pursuing a defensive modernization strategy aimed at deterrence-by-denial over time, though near-term capacity remains limited.

Net assessment Compared with the baseline, new evidence strengthens the stabilizer side (EU integration, energy/cyber resilience efforts, defensive modernization) but also confirms continued hybrid pressure and recurring regional security incidents. The base rate still favors “high tension, low kinetics.” A material upward shift would require a sharp deterioration in southern Ukraine, a breakdown of control in/around Transnistria, or a domestic political crisis that fractures security decision-making.