Latvia

Latvia is unlikely to be directly involved in significant armed conflict in the next three years, but it faces a meaningful tail risk of hybrid-to-kinetic escalation or a localized Russia/Belarus-linked incident that triggers NATO crisis dynamics.

Latvia is very likely to face continued hybrid pressure: elevated cyber activity, disinformation, sabotage/arson attempts, GPS interference, and episodic border frictions linked to Belarusian instrumentalized migration. The main acute risk is a lethal hybrid incident or a small border/air/sea miscalculation that forces rapid NATO consultations. A deliberate Russian conventional attack remains unlikely over the next year given deterrence and Russia’s competing military demands.

Risk could rise if the Ukraine war de-intensifies and Russia regenerates land forces and stockpiles while NATO cohesion or reinforcement credibility weakens, especially in air and missile defense and logistics. Offsetting this, Latvia’s defense-spending trajectory, conscription pipeline, border fortification, and deeper Nordic-Baltic-Polish integration should strengthen deterrence by denial. Key swing factors are Russia’s regeneration pace, Baltic air defense maturation, and allied political cohesion.

Security situation Latvia sits on NATO’s most exposed frontier and continues to face persistent gray-zone coercion: cyber activity, sabotage/arson risk, disinformation, GPS interference, and pressure around borders and the Baltic Sea. Reporting from Latvian security institutions emphasizes long-term Russian intent to sustain pressure and prepare options, while still judging an immediate direct attack unlikely.

Threat drivers (what could push Latvia into conflict) The most credible pathway to significant armed conflict within three years is not a deliberate armored invasion but escalation from hybrid operations or a localized incident. Scenarios include: a lethal sabotage or cyber-physical attack on critical infrastructure; a border confrontation linked to Belarusian instrumentalized migration and security-force contact; or an air/sea incident in the Baltic region that produces fatalities and compresses NATO decision timelines. Russia’s demonstrated willingness to run risk below the Article 5 threshold, combined with Belarus’ role in border pressure, keeps the escalation tail risk non-trivial.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (why peace can hold) NATO collective defense is the dominant stabilizer. Multinational forces in Latvia raise the certainty of immediate allied involvement and sharply increase the expected cost of overt attack. Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership improves Baltic Sea operational depth and reinforcement options. Latvia is also strengthening deterrence by denial through higher defense spending ambitions, capability procurement (including air defense and long-range fires), border fortification efforts, and total-defense style reserve development. Institutionally, Latvia’s governance and security services show sustained focus on counterintelligence, counter-sabotage, and crisis preparedness.

Net assessment New evidence reinforces the baseline rather than overturning it: Latvian services warn of mounting long-term risk and elevated hybrid activity, but do not indicate imminent deliberate interstate attack. The risk remains concentrated in miscalculation and hybrid-to-kinetic escalation, with a low-probability, high-impact tail risk if Russia regenerates capacity and perceives NATO political fracture or weak reinforcement credibility.