Lebanon

It is likely that Lebanon will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, driven primarily by renewed Israel–Hezbollah escalation and secondarily by a destabilizing internal confrontation over weapons control.

Most likely: continued low-to-medium intensity cross-border incidents and strikes, with the LAF sustaining deployments south of the Litani alongside international monitoring and diplomacy. Key downside: a mass-casualty event, leadership targeting, or UNIFIL operational disruption that accelerates escalation faster than political channels can contain. Key upside: a stable UNIFIL successor/renewal plus credible enforcement that reduces strike tempo and enables returns and reconstruction.

Risk becomes path-dependent on whether Lebanon can institutionalize a durable border-security architecture and a negotiated, phased weapons settlement without fracturing internal cohesion. If UN monitoring persists, LAF resourcing improves, and economic stabilization raises the cost of war, conflict intensity can trend down. If monitoring erodes and disarmament becomes coercive amid regional shocks, major fighting becomes more probable.

Security situation Lebanon’s dominant conflict pathway remains the southern front. The cessation-of-hostilities framework reduces deliberate escalation incentives but does not remove operational contact, contested areas, or the logic of preventive strikes and deterrent signaling. Continued incidents affecting UNIFIL activity and persistent Israeli freedom-of-action claims keep the theater “hot,” meaning a single high-casualty event can still cascade into broader fighting.

Threat drivers Cross-border escalation: The highest-probability driver is a renewed Israel–Hezbollah exchange that exceeds the containment capacity of deconfliction channels. Key triggers include leadership targeting, mass-casualty strikes, misattributed launches, or an Iran–Israel shock that activates Lebanese arenas.

UNIFIL transition risk: The approaching mandate decision and any drawdown or reduced operational tempo would weaken monitoring, liaison, and incident management. Even if the LAF expands deployments, the loss of an international buffer increases uncertainty and raises the chance that tactical incidents become strategic.

Internal sovereignty confrontation: The government’s phased approach to dismantling unauthorized infrastructure and restricting weapons south of the Litani is a relative stabilizer when incremental and consensual, but becomes a risk amplifier if pushed northward without a durable political bargain. A coercive attempt to impose a monopoly of force could provoke armed resistance, localized fragmentation, or paralysis that invites external pressure and strikes.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (pre-mortem: why peace could hold) Lebanon’s strongest stabilizer is deterrence by catastrophe: broad public and elite fear of state failure and reconstruction costs. Hezbollah also has incentives to avoid a decisive war while it adapts to disrupted logistics and scrutiny. External engagement (UN mechanisms, US/France channels, conditional support to the LAF) provides communication pathways and some restraint. Incremental border management and economic opportunity costs can sustain a tense but managed equilibrium.

Net assessment New evidence does not materially reduce the structural exposure: monitoring frictions, continued border incidents, and limited state capacity to prevent or absorb escalation keep the three-year risk very high. Compared to the baseline, UNIFIL uncertainty and persistent incident tempo edge risk upward slightly to 0.74.