Kiribati

It is unlikely (around 3%) that Kiribati will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, with risk concentrated in low-probability major-power spillover scenarios rather than domestic drivers.

Kiribati is very likely to remain peaceful over the next year. Security activity will center on policing, fisheries/EEZ enforcement, maritime domain awareness support from partners, and disaster preparedness. The most plausible disruptions are non-kinetic: cyber incidents, information influence, or governance disputes around aid and procurement. No credible indicators point to armed mobilization, insurgency, or imminent interstate confrontation involving Kiribati.

Over five years, climate impacts and fiscal volatility could increase political friction and episodic unrest, but significant armed conflict remains structurally unlikely without militarization or armed-group formation. The key swing factor is systemic: a major Indo-Pacific war could expand operational geography and raise coercive access pressure or incidental kinetic risk around dual-use infrastructure and sea/air approaches, modestly increasing exposure even if Kiribati seeks neutrality.

Security situation Kiribati remains a non-militarized microstate whose internal security is handled by police and maritime enforcement. Available reporting continues to describe low crime, no history of terrorism, and very limited civil unrest, which structurally constrains escalation into sustained armed violence.

Threat drivers External alignment salience is the primary risk channel. Kiribati’s ongoing engagement with China, including a signed development cooperation agreement and high-level diplomatic messaging, can increase geopolitical attention and suspicion about dual-use infrastructure. However, the new material does not provide credible indicators of a security treaty, basing rights, force deployments, or a domestic militarization program that would raise the near-term probability of kinetic conflict.

A secondary channel is gray-zone pressure (influence operations, cyber espionage, and political leverage). Kiribati’s connectivity and governance systems are plausible targets in broader regional competition, and general reporting highlights persistent state-linked cyber activity globally. Still, cyber/influence activity typically remains below the threshold of armed conflict and is more likely to manifest as governance disruption than direct kinetic involvement.

Domestic stressors (climate shocks, fiscal volatility, and service-delivery strain) remain serious but weakly coupled to armed conflict. IMF assessments emphasize downside macro risks and high climate vulnerability; these conditions can raise protest risk, but Kiribati’s small population, limited weapons access, and absence of organized armed actors make civil-war pathways structurally remote.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Firebreaks remain strong: geographic dispersion, lack of armed forces, strict firearms controls, and high dependence on external assistance oriented toward stability and disaster response. Governance and integrity-strengthening efforts add modest resilience. Regional diplomacy and development frameworks also incentivize de-escalation.

Net assessment (next 3 years) No new structural evidence warrants a major revision upward from the baseline. The modal outcome is continued peace. The principal tail risk remains a wider Indo-Pacific contingency that expands into the central Pacific, creating coercive access demands or incidental kinetic effects involving Kiribati-linked infrastructure or maritime approaches.