Cambodia

Cambodia is unlikely to enter a major war, but there is a realistic possibility of renewed, localized interstate fighting along the Thailand border within the next three years.

Border areas remain the key risk zone. Expect continued militarized incidents (mines, patrol clashes, sporadic indirect fire) and sharp rhetoric, but with strong incentives on both sides to cap escalation after any flare-up. The most likely outcome is tense management via bilateral channels and ASEAN facilitation, with travel/security advisories focused on specific provinces rather than nationwide instability.

If the Thailand dispute remains unresolved, recurrence risk persists, especially if force modernization (air defense, rockets, drones) continues and domestic politics reward toughness. However, Cambodia’s structural constraints, economic exposure, and external pressure from ASEAN and major partners should still bias outcomes toward contained border engagements and negotiated pauses rather than sustained war. A durable demarcation mechanism would materially reduce risk.

Security situation Cambodia’s most plausible pathway to significant armed conflict is interstate escalation with Thailand around disputed border areas. Reporting indicates a 2025 cycle of skirmishes, artillery/rocket exchanges, and Thai air strikes, followed by a ceasefire that later frayed amid mine incidents and mutual accusations. Early-2026 reporting of troop movements and air-defense procurement claims increases concern, but also contains countervailing official statements describing calm conditions and routine rotations.

Threat drivers The structural drivers are persistent territorial disputes, dense militarization in rugged border terrain, legacy landmine contamination, and domestic political incentives in both states to signal resolve after incidents. Cambodia’s growing ground-based fires and air-defense investments could raise Thai threat perceptions and shorten decision time in a crisis. Information operations and rumor dynamics around elections or border incidents can also amplify miscalculation.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Cambodia has strong incentives to avoid sustained war: economic fragilities and financial-sector vulnerabilities make prolonged conflict costly; the regime prioritizes internal control and growth over external adventurism. Militarily, Cambodia remains optimized for territorial defense/internal security and lacks the air and maritime capabilities for deep offensive operations, limiting escalation options and making deterrence-by-denial more likely than coercion. Regionally, ASEAN crisis-management habits, plus U.S./China interests in preventing a wider Southeast Asian conflict, create diplomatic off-ramps even when rhetoric hardens.

Net assessment The base rate for Cambodia is low interstate-war involvement, but the post-2025 border environment is a material upward shift from a purely latent dispute to a demonstrated kinetic flashpoint. The most likely conflict form is short, intense border engagements (artillery/rockets, limited air strikes) rather than a prolonged conventional war or civil war. Overall risk remains below 50% because stabilizers and capability constraints still dominate, but it is no longer negligible.