Jordan

Unlikely (roughly one-in-five) that Jordan will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, with risk concentrated in regional spillover and airspace/border incidents rather than deliberate war initiation.

Risk stays low-to-moderate. Expect continued high alert, intermittent protests, and occasional border/airspace incidents tied to Israel/Palestine and Iran-aligned networks. Jordan will likely keep prioritizing de-escalation, interceptions, and targeted counterterror/border actions, leaning on U.S./EU support to avoid escalation into sustained fighting.

Over five years, risk depends on whether the region normalizes or hardens into recurring Iran–Israel exchanges and West Bank instability. If missile/drone salvos and militia logistics routes persist, Jordan’s exposure to repeated incidents and retaliatory pressures rises. If external aid and security cooperation remain robust, Jordan is still more likely to see episodic defensive engagements than sustained war.

Security situation Jordan borders active or fragile theaters (Israel/Palestine, Syria, Iraq) and sits under the wider Iran–Israel confrontation arc. Recent patterns of drone/missile overflight and heightened border vigilance increase incident probability, but most events remain short-duration and containable.

Threat drivers The dominant driver is spillover from regional escalation: airspace incursions, debris/impacts, cross-border smuggling and militant infiltration attempts, and terrorism risks around sensitive nodes (including border crossings). Israel’s heightened concern about its eastern border and Jordan’s own elevated readiness posture indicate a more stressed perimeter environment. Domestic protest cycles linked to Gaza raise the chance of localized violence and security-force clashes, which can degrade bandwidth and create miscalculation risk, but do not by themselves imply civil war dynamics.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Jordan’s security institutions remain cohesive and experienced in counterterrorism and border control. The regime’s core incentive is internal stability and continuity of external support, reinforcing restraint. Deepened cooperation with the EU (including border management support) and longstanding U.S. security cooperation strengthen deterrence, surveillance, and crisis management. The Israel–Jordan peace treaty remains a major structural firebreak: even amid severe political strain, Amman signals that revocation would harm Jordanian and Palestinian interests, implying continued preference for managed security coordination.

Net assessment The modal outcome is episodic, defensive kinetic activity (interceptions, limited border engagements, targeted raids) that stays below the threshold of significant armed conflict. The tail risk is a sharp regional rupture (major Iran–Israel escalation, West Bank destabilization, or Syrian border deterioration) producing repeated strikes/incidents that compel sustained Jordanian operations or draws Jordan into a broader coalition fight. New evidence modestly increases exposure indicators but also strengthens the stabilizer side via expanded external partnerships; overall risk rises slightly but remains unlikely.