Israel

It is almost certain (around 90%) that Israel will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, with recurrent Gaza/West Bank operations and a persistent escalation pathway on the Lebanon and Iran axes.

Most likely is continued high operational tempo under fragile ceasefires: Gaza enforcement and periodic flare-ups, sustained West Bank counterterrorism, and intermittent Lebanon border strike cycles. The main swing factors are a mass-casualty incident on the northern front, a breakdown in Gaza arrangements, or renewed direct Israel–Iran exchange driven by perceived nuclear or deterrence windows.

Risk remains very high but becomes more path-dependent. A durable reduction requires a credible Gaza governance and security architecture, enforceable constraints on Hezbollah rearmament and border rules, and a verifiable Iran nuclear framework that reduces preemption incentives. Absent these, expect recurrent limited wars with periodic spikes and a persistent tail risk of a larger Lebanon war or direct Israel–Iran conflict.

Security Situation Israel remains embedded in a multi-front conflict system with ongoing Gaza operations, chronic West Bank violence, and a high-miscalculation northern theater. The key analytic point is base-rate anchoring: absent a durable political-security settlement, the default is recurring kinetic episodes rather than a stable post-war equilibrium.

Threat Drivers Gaza is the most reliable ignition source because “day after” governance and security arrangements remain contested; fragmentation of armed groups and criminal-militant networks sustains raids, rocket fire, and re-entry operations. The West Bank adds persistent escalation risk via attacks, counterterror raids, and settler–Palestinian violence; any further weakening of Palestinian Authority capacity would raise the likelihood of sustained high-casualty operations.

Lebanon is the fastest route to a major war. Hezbollah’s incentives to reconstitute deterrence, dense border geography, and preemption logic create a narrow decision window after mass-casualty incidents. Even if both sides prefer managed attrition, the system is prone to accident and rapid action-reaction cycles.

Iran remains the principal high-intensity accelerant. The post-2025 precedent of direct exchange increases the credibility of renewed direct strikes and missile/drone retaliation, especially if nuclear “window” perceptions sharpen or if either side believes defenses or political backing are temporarily favorable.

Resilience and Firebreaks (Pre-mortem: how peace could hold) Israel’s intelligence, mobilization capacity, and layered air/missile defenses, plus deep U.S. security cooperation, reduce the probability of prolonged existential war and can shorten campaigns. Regional normalization and trade ties with some Arab states create incentives to limit spillover. However, these are escalation dampeners, not conflict preventers, because they do not resolve the core territorial-governance and deterrence contests.

Net Assessment The most probable outcome is continued significant armed conflict involvement (often episodic but recurring), with a meaningful tail risk of a larger Lebanon war or another direct Israel–Iran round. Domestic polarization and governance strain can further narrow crisis decision space, increasing miscalculation risk.