Iran

Iran is likely (roughly 60–70%) to be directly involved in at least one significant armed conflict episode within the next three years, most plausibly a short, intense interstate exchange with Israel and/or the United States rather than a prolonged conventional war.

Most likely outcome is continued high-tempo gray-zone activity with a meaningful chance of a short direct strike/retaliation episode tied to nuclear sites, air defenses, or maritime incidents. Domestic unrest and repression increase volatility and misperception risk, but the state’s coercive capacity and external actors’ desire to avoid oil-market shock still favor bounded exchanges and ceasefire off-ramps.

Over five years, risk hinges on nuclear trajectory, leadership succession dynamics, and whether crisis-management channels persist. If Iran further reduces transparency with the IAEA or moves closer to weaponization, preventive-strike incentives rise. If deterrence and backchannels hold, conflict remains episodic. A chaotic succession or severe economic rupture would raise both internal violence risk and external diversionary escalation incentives.

Security situation The dominant pathway to “significant armed conflict” remains renewed direct kinetic exchange involving Iran and Israel and/or the United States. The key feature is not inevitability of major war but a high frequency of triggerable, short-duration strike/retaliation cycles (air/missile, maritime, and cyber-kinetic spillover) that can cross the significance threshold quickly.

Threat drivers First, the post-2024/2025 pattern of direct Israel–Iran exchanges lowers the political and operational barriers to repeat action, especially around nuclear-related targets, air defenses, and command nodes. Second, nuclear brinkmanship and IAEA cooperation disputes increase the chance of a catalytic event (surprise finding, sabotage, or pre-emption logic) that compresses decision time. Third, maritime exposure in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz creates persistent incident risk with outsized escalation potential. Fourth, domestic unrest and harsh repression raise regime threat perceptions; in a crisis, leaders may over-interpret external involvement and choose demonstrative retaliation to restore deterrence.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (pre-mortem: why peace can hold) Iran’s leadership has strong incentives to avoid a sustained conventional war it would likely lose in airpower and economic endurance. Mutual deterrence remains credible: Iran can impose regional costs (missiles, drones, partner forces, shipping disruption), while Israel/US can impose severe damage on critical infrastructure and regime security assets. This balance typically favors limited, signaled operations with off-ramps. Iran’s internal security apparatus has repeatedly shown capacity to contain protest waves through repression, selective concessions, and institutional adaptation, reducing the probability that unrest becomes civil war or state collapse on the three-year horizon.

Net assessment New reporting on large-scale protests and repression increases volatility and miscalculation risk but does not, by itself, prove imminent regime collapse. The structural picture still points to a high likelihood of episodic direct clashes, with a lower (but non-trivial) chance of a broader, sustained interstate campaign if a nuclear or high-casualty trigger removes off-ramps.