Haiti

It is almost certain that Haiti will remain directly involved in significant armed conflict over the next three years, primarily as a sustained high-intensity non-international armed conflict between gang coalitions and state-aligned forces, with intermittent surges and localized shifts in control.

Haiti is almost certain to remain in significant intrastate armed conflict over the next year. Expect continued gang control/contestation in Port-au-Prince and along key corridors, with periodic surges tied to coalition offensives, police operations, and political transition deadlines. External support may secure limited infrastructure nodes, but near-term operations are likely to produce short-run spikes in clashes, displacement, and civilian harm.

Over five years, the most likely trajectory is protracted conflict with uneven, node-based improvements if external support persists and Haitian force generation and governance reforms advance. A durable downshift requires credible elections, anti-corruption enforcement, justice-sector rebuilding, and tighter arms-flow interdiction; absent these, armed groups retain incentives and capacity to regenerate. Interstate war remains unlikely; regional effects concentrate in migration and trafficking.

Security Situation Haiti’s violence continues to meet practical thresholds for significant armed conflict: organized armed groups conduct coordinated operations, hold/contest territory, and repeatedly clash with the Haitian National Police (HNP) and state-aligned forces. The dominant pathway remains protracted non-international armed conflict, not interstate war.

Threat Drivers The core driver is a criminalized political economy in which armed groups monetize territorial control through extortion, kidnapping, control of transport corridors, and influence over ports and markets. Coalition dynamics and tactical adaptation expand operational reach and enable multi-front assaults. Gang expansion beyond Port-au-Prince into key routes and provincial nodes increases the risk of fragmented “armed governance” and retaliatory violence involving self-defense groups.

Arms inflows and transnational trafficking linkages sustain firepower and financing. Political uncertainty around transitional governance and election sequencing creates incentives for armed actors and their patrons to shape outcomes through coercion. Emerging state use of strike-capable drones may yield tactical effects but also raises risks of escalation, civilian harm, and further fragmentation if not paired with scalable policing, justice, and detention capacity.

Resilience and Systemic Firebreaks (Pre-mortem) Haiti’s interstate war risk remains structurally low: it has limited conventional capability and neighbors strongly prefer containment over confrontation. External engagement (UN architecture, sanctions, technical assistance, and the multinational security effort) can reduce violence at specific nodes if adequately resourced and politically coherent. A credible electoral pathway, anti-corruption measures, and sustained support to HNP recruitment, pay, logistics, intelligence, and border/port controls could gradually improve state performance.

Net Assessment New evidence does not materially reduce the baseline risk; it reinforces it. The multinational effort remains mismatched to the scale of armed control, while Haitian security institutions remain too thin to restore a monopoly of force nationwide within three years. The modal outcome through 2029 is continued significant intrastate armed conflict with episodic surges, localized tactical gains/losses, and severe humanitarian spillovers. Regional spillover is more likely via migration and trafficking than cross-border kinetic conflict.