Fiji

Unlikely (roughly 6%) that Fiji will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years; the dominant risks are coercion, cyber/influence activity, and transnational crime rather than kinetic war.

Low risk. Expect security focus on maritime policing, airport/port readiness, and inter-agency coordination under the National Security Strategy. Great-power competition will show mainly as diplomatic signaling, aid/infrastructure bargaining, and cyber/information activity. A near-term kinetic scenario is most plausible as an isolated maritime or port incident, not sustained fighting.

Low-to-moderate risk. If a major Indo-Pacific war erupts, Fiji could face sharper demands over access, logistics, and basing, increasing incident risk around ports, airfields, and EEZ enforcement. Absent that systemic rupture, the dominant threats remain organized crime, governance stress, and cyber disruption rather than direct armed conflict.

Security situation Fiji is geographically insulated and lacks an interstate territorial dispute that plausibly escalates to major combat. The Republic of Fiji Military Forces are structured for internal support, maritime tasks, disaster response, and peacekeeping rather than sustained high-end warfighting, which constrains Fiji’s ability to initiate or sustain significant armed conflict.

Threat drivers The main upward pressure comes from Indo-Pacific strategic competition spilling into the Pacific through access politics, infrastructure leverage, and alignment signaling. Fiji’s reaffirmation of the One China policy and active diplomacy with multiple partners illustrate the balancing act; missteps can trigger diplomatic crises, coercive measures, or heightened intelligence activity, but these typically remain below the threshold of significant armed conflict. A secondary risk channel is maritime and border security stress from transnational organized crime (notably narcotics trafficking). Large seizures and reporting on gaps in port/wharf security indicate a real internal security burden; however, this is better modeled as law-enforcement and governance risk than armed conflict. Cyber and foreign interference risks are rising globally and can target government and critical infrastructure. Even when severe, these are more likely to produce disruption and political friction than open warfare.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Domestic politics show competitive contestation but not an organized armed insurgency. Governance and rule-of-law reform agendas, plus whole-of-government security planning (National Security Strategy 2025–2029 following the NSDR), strengthen coordination and reduce coup/fragmentation pathways. Externally, Fiji’s security cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and others functions as a deterrent and crisis-management buffer. Such ties can increase alliance exposure, but Fiji retains strong incentives to avoid becoming a kinetic battleground because tourism, investment, and fiscal stability are highly sensitive to conflict.

Net assessment The most plausible 3-year outcomes are intensified political influence competition, cyber incidents, and maritime policing challenges. Direct involvement in significant armed conflict remains unlikely unless a wider Indo-Pacific war expands into the South Pacific and compels basing/operational use that Fiji cannot credibly refuse.