Ethiopia

Likely (around two-in-three) that Ethiopia will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, driven primarily by internal multi-theater escalation risk with a secondary but rising interstate miscalculation risk (especially Eritrea).

High likelihood of continued significant violence in Amhara and parts of Oromia, with episodic spikes tied to security operations, militia mobilization, and arrests under emergency measures. The key near-term escalation risk is renewed northern clashes if force separation and political implementation mechanisms fail. Interstate escalation remains a secondary risk, but border incidents and proxy allegations involving Eritrea warrant close monitoring.

If Ethiopia secures a durable center–region bargain, demobilizes/absorbs regional forces, and stabilizes macro conditions, conflict could de-intensify into localized insurgency and criminality. If institutional linkage remains weak and elite bargains fracture, Ethiopia faces recurrent multi-theater warfare and a higher chance of external entanglement (Eritrea and Sudan border zones), especially if maritime-access disputes harden into coercive signaling.

Security Situation Ethiopia is not in a single post-war “recovery” track; it is managing multiple armed systems with different logics. The highest-probability pathway to significant armed conflict remains internal: sustained ENDF operations against organized regional armed actors and militias, with the risk of simultaneous escalation across Amhara and Oromia and renewed northern confrontation if implementation and command arrangements fail.

Threat Drivers Amhara’s confrontation between federal forces and Fano-aligned militias remains a high-intensity arena with state-of-emergency dynamics and reported mass displacement and civilian harm. Oromia’s insurgency/counterinsurgency cycle continues to generate persistent violence and governance contestation. The northern file remains structurally fragile: disputed territories, incomplete demobilization, and weak monitoring/separation mechanisms create a standing risk of renewed clashes and rapid escalation if mobilization resumes.

External/Interstate Risk Interstate war is still less likely than internal escalation, but the Ethiopia–Eritrea dyad has moved upward as a miscalculation risk. Rhetoric and allegations of border mobilization, combined with Ethiopia’s strategic push for maritime access and Eritrea’s history of proxy approaches, increase the chance of border incidents that could widen if domestic instability incentivizes externalization or if either side misreads deterrence signals.

Resilience and Firebreaks Ethiopia retains major stabilizers: large security forces, war fatigue, and strong incentives to avoid another national-scale war given reconstruction needs and macro/FX stress. Addis Ababa’s multilateral positioning (AU roles, regional diplomacy) and external stakeholders’ preference for containment provide diplomatic off-ramps. Military modernization and improved air/ISR response can strengthen deterrence and crisis response, but it can also raise operational tempo and confidence, which does not substitute for political settlement.

Net Assessment New reporting reinforces that internal conflict remains active and that northern arrangements are vulnerable; this sustains a high risk score. The modal outcome is not deliberate interstate conquest but renewed or expanded internal warfare, with a meaningful tail risk of Ethiopia–Eritrea escalation via incident chains.