Eritrea

Unlikely (roughly 35–45%) that Eritrea will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, but the Ethiopia border and Red Sea access disputes create a persistent escalation pathway.

Risk is elevated but still more likely to manifest as border alerts, raids, and coercive signaling than sustained war. Ethiopia’s internal fighting and contested authority in the north increase the chance of incidents that escalate. Watch for verified mobilization, drone/artillery exchanges near flashpoints, and formal diplomatic rupture; these would quickly move the risk into the “more likely than not” range.

Over five years, risk trends upward if Ethiopia’s state cohesion remains strained and if Red Sea access becomes a nationalist, security-backed project rather than a negotiated economic arrangement. Conversely, any durable border-management mechanism, demarcation steps, or structured port/transit agreements would materially reduce war likelihood. Leadership succession uncertainty in either state is a medium-term wild card that could cut either way.

Risk definition This assesses the chance Eritrea is directly involved in significant armed conflict (interstate or major cross-border fighting), not routine repression or low-level incidents.

Threat drivers The dominant driver is the Ethiopia dyad. Multiple 2025–2026 risk products flag the relationship as structurally fragile: unresolved border implementation, high militarization, and deep political distrust. Recent reporting indicates heightened rhetoric and alleged troop movements/incursions along sensitive northern corridors, raising the probability of miscalculation. Ethiopia’s continuing internal conflicts (notably in Amhara and renewed instability in the north) act as a risk multiplier by creating armed actors, blurred command-and-control, and incentives to externalize pressure. A secondary driver is Red Sea geopolitics: Ethiopia’s strategic desire for maritime access and Eritrea’s sensitivity around sovereignty at Assab/Massawa can turn bargaining into coercive postures.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Eritrea’s internal security apparatus and monopoly on force reduce civil-war risk; the state is coercively cohesive even if institutionally brittle. Geography and logistics favor defense; Eritrea can impose high costs on an invader, which supports deterrence and makes deliberate large-scale offensives less attractive. Eritrea’s force posture appears oriented toward denial and ambiguity rather than sustained power projection; constraints in air/naval capacity and economic depth also limit appetite for prolonged conventional war. Internationally, the costs of a new interstate war in the Horn (humanitarian, trade, Red Sea security) create diplomatic pressure for de-escalation, even if mediation mechanisms are imperfect.

Net assessment The balance has shifted upward versus a calm baseline because the Ethiopia border theater shows more active warning signals and Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation increases spillover risk. Still, structural deterrents and high expected costs make a full-scale war less likely than a cycle of brinkmanship, raids, and short, sharp clashes that could nonetheless become “significant” if they expand.

Key signposts Verified mobilization near flashpoints; sustained artillery/drone use near the border; formal breakdown of diplomatic channels; explicit Ethiopian moves on port access backed by force; third-party basing or arms transfers that alter local air-defense/drone balances.