Ecuador

Ecuador is unlikely but plausibly at risk (roughly 28%) of being directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, driven mainly by escalation of state–organized crime violence rather than interstate war.

Risk remains elevated but mostly contained to criminal violence and state counter-operations. Expect continued emergency measures, troop deployments, and episodic spikes in killings (especially coastal provinces and prisons). A step-change toward “armed conflict” would be signaled by sustained, coordinated attacks on security forces/ports, or loss of prison control that forces continuous military operations.

Over five years, the trajectory depends on whether security gains are institutionalized (police/judicial reform, prison control, anti-corruption) or whether militarization and rights backsliding erode legitimacy. If criminal groups consolidate territorial governance and state capacity stagnates, Ecuador could drift toward chronic low-intensity internal conflict. Interstate war remains a low-probability tail risk absent a new border shock.

Risk definition and base rate For Ecuador, “significant armed conflict” is most credibly a high-intensity internal conflict between state forces and organized armed groups, not conventional interstate war. The base rate in South America for interstate conflict is low; Ecuador’s risk is elevated by domestic security dynamics.

Threat drivers (upward pressure) Organized crime has become the dominant security driver, with sustained lethal violence concentrated in coastal provinces and prisons, and the government framing the situation as an “internal armed conflict.” Large-scale troop deployments and indefinite military tasking in key trafficking corridors increase the chance of prolonged, casualty-producing engagements and retaliatory cycles. Governance fragility and polarization raise the risk that security policy becomes more coercive while still ineffective, which can widen recruitment pools for armed groups and intensify clashes. Human-rights concerns and pressure on judicial independence can degrade legitimacy and oversight, increasing the probability of abuses that fuel further violence.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (downward pressure) Ecuador still has strong firebreaks against classic civil war: no large insurgency with a national political program, no broad territorial secession project, and limited heavy-weapon capacity among criminal groups relative to the state. The armed forces remain cohesive and the state retains international recognition and access to security cooperation. Economic and trade alignment with the United States and other partners supports continuity incentives and resources for state capacity, even if it does not directly solve violence. Regionally, Ecuador’s settled border environment and the absence of alliance entanglements reduce interstate escalation pathways.

Net assessment The most plausible pathway to “significant armed conflict” is a sustained, militarized campaign against cartels that crosses a threshold of frequency, geographic spread, and casualties (including attacks on security forces, prisons, ports, and critical infrastructure). However, structural constraints on insurgent transformation, plus strong incentives for negotiated governance and external support, make a full civil-war trajectory less likely than continued severe criminal violence.

Key signposts Persistent nationwide states of emergency; rising attacks on military/police and critical infrastructure; prison system loss of control; emergence of durable armed governance by gangs; or breakdown in civil-military discipline would push risk higher.