Costa Rica

Unlikely: Costa Rica has a low probability of direct involvement in significant armed conflict in the next three years, with risk concentrated in localized border incidents and spillover from transnational organized crime rather than war.

Crime and political polarization will dominate the security agenda, with episodic protests and targeted violence possible. Expect continued counter-narcotics cooperation and incremental policing/judicial measures. Border frictions with Nicaragua may recur rhetorically or through minor incidents, but escalation to sustained armed conflict is unlikely.

If organized-crime penetration of ports, municipalities, and prisons deepens faster than institutional reform, Costa Rica could face higher levels of armed criminal violence and governance stress. Even then, the more plausible trajectory is a “high-crime” state rather than civil war or interstate conflict, unless a major Nicaragua crisis or regional shock removes diplomatic firebreaks.

Net assessment Costa Rica’s three-year conflict risk remains low by base rate and structure: it has no standing army, limited power-projection capacity, and a strategic culture oriented to law, diplomacy, and international adjudication. These features reduce both intent and capability for major kinetic involvement.

Threat drivers The dominant security deterioration is internal: transnational organized crime, trafficking corridors, and associated homicide/armed robbery trends. This can stress police, prisons, and courts and raise the chance of tactical firefights, but it does not equate to civil war absent insurgent organization, territorial control, and political-military objectives. A secondary driver is periodic sovereignty/border friction with Nicaragua (river/maritime issues). In a worst case, this could generate a short, localized armed incident involving police or border units.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Costa Rica’s democratic institutions, rule-of-law orientation, and international partnerships provide strong de-escalation pathways. Security cooperation focuses on maritime interdiction and policing rather than alliance warfighting, limiting entanglement risk. Economic openness and investment dependence increase the political cost of escalation. Regionally, neighbors have limited incentives for interstate war with Costa Rica, and disputes have historically been managed through diplomacy and legal mechanisms.

What would change the score Material upward revision would require evidence of (a) sustained militarized border deployments and repeated armed clashes with Nicaragua, (b) emergence of an organized armed group with political aims and territorial control, or (c) a major external power using Costa Rican territory as a military platform. Current evidence points instead to crime-driven insecurity and cyber disruption as salient risks, not significant armed conflict.