Comoros

It is unlikely that Comoros will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, though episodic political violence and maritime-security incidents remain plausible.

Low risk of significant armed conflict. Expect occasional protests, localized clashes, and crime pressures, with heightened sensitivity around political events and economic shocks. Maritime-security incidents (trafficking/illegal fishing; occasional armed robbery at sea) remain plausible but are likely to stay below the threshold of sustained conflict. Key watch items: security-force cohesion, protest repression dynamics, and any signs of organized armed-group formation.

Risk rises modestly if governance legitimacy erodes, fiscal stress deepens, or island-level political competition hardens into sustained violent confrontation. However, structural firebreaks persist: no land borders, limited strategic value for interstate war, and external partners’ interest in stability in the Western Indian Ocean. The most likely trajectory is continued fragility with episodic unrest rather than civil war or interstate conflict.

Net assessment The base rate for Comoros is continuity: low probability of sustained civil war or interstate war. The country’s main risks are internal political volatility and localized violence rather than organized armed conflict.

Threat drivers Comoros has a history of coups and contested politics, and current travel-security reporting flags periodic unrest and medium political-violence risk for foreign interests. Youth unemployment and limited opportunity create a permissive environment for radicalization narratives, while fragmented security services and limited law-enforcement capacity increase the chance that protests or elite disputes turn violent. Maritime insecurity (trafficking, illegal fishing, opportunistic piracy/armed robbery at sea) is a persistent background risk in the wider Western Indian Ocean, and Comoros’ limited naval capacity constrains deterrence.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Geography is a major stabilizer: as a small archipelago, Comoros has no land borders and limited exposure to the Sahel’s insurgency belt. The state’s limited military capability reduces both its ability to project force and the likelihood of being drawn into regional interstate wars. External security backstops and diplomatic ties with larger partners (notably France’s regional presence and broader Indian Ocean security cooperation) raise the threshold for any escalation that threatens regime survival. Available governance indicators and travel advisories point to fragility and crime/unrest concerns, but not to an active insurgency, widespread terrorism, or sustained armed-group territorial control.

Pathways to significant armed conflict (3-year window) The most credible pathway is an acute domestic political crisis (elections/constitutional disputes) producing sustained violent confrontation between security forces and organized opposition, potentially splintering island-level forces. A secondary pathway is a major maritime incident that triggers armed clashes involving state forces, but this is more likely to remain limited and episodic.

Overall Threats are real but mostly sub-conflict intensity; resilience and firebreaks keep the probability of significant armed conflict low.