Colombia

Colombia is more likely than not to face sustained internal armed violence, but the chance it escalates into a nationwide, high-intensity armed conflict within three years is assessed as roughly even (45%).

Most likely: continued high armed activity in specific corridors (e.g., Pacific coast, southwest, Catatumbo) with intermittent talks/ceasefires that fragment or exclude key factions. Expect elevated IED/mine risk and more drone-enabled attacks, plus displacement spikes. Low probability of interstate escalation; border incidents should remain containable unless a major cross-border strike or sanctuary dynamic emerges.

If macro stability and judicial checks persist, Colombia likely avoids nationwide civil war but may entrench a “chronic conflict” equilibrium: contested rural zones, periodic humanitarian surges, and adaptive armed-group tactics. A durable improvement requires sustained territorial governance, credible demobilization pathways, and disruption of illicit finance. A sharp fiscal/security capacity shock or breakdown of political consensus could push risk higher.

Risk definition This assesses direct involvement in significant armed conflict within three years, primarily internal (state vs organized armed groups and inter-group warfare), not routine crime or protests.

Threat drivers Colombia’s post-2016 landscape features persistent, geographically concentrated armed violence driven by cocaine economies, illegal mining, and control of corridors. Fragmentation among FARC dissidents, ELN elements, and criminal networks increases volatility and reduces the reliability of ceasefires and negotiations. Recent reporting indicates rising attacks (including drone-delivered explosives), continued displacement, and high civilian harm from explosive devices, consistent with an adaptive insurgent/criminal threat that can outpace local governance in peripheral departments.

Resilience and state capacity Colombia retains meaningful firebreaks: a professionalized security sector with sustained operational tempo; macroeconomic and monetary institutions that have historically preserved stability through political cycles; and a functioning constitutional order with credible judicial review that constrains executive overreach. These factors reduce the probability that insecurity translates into a generalized state failure or a classic civil-war escalation across the national core.

Political and institutional stress Polarization and governance disputes can degrade security policy coherence and territorial consolidation. However, visible institutional contestation (courts, subnational leaders, congress) is better read as system friction within a still-working constitutional framework rather than imminent collapse.

External escalation risk Border dynamics with Venezuela can spike tactically, but recent episodes suggest rapid de-escalation incentives on all sides. U.S.-Colombia tensions may reduce cooperation and resources at the margin, yet they are unlikely to produce direct interstate war; the dominant risk channel is indirect—less capacity against armed groups.

Net assessment Threat drivers are strong and trending toward sustained localized conflict; resilience is also real. The most probable outcome is continued high violence in specific regions rather than nationwide high-intensity war, yielding a mid-range three-year risk.