Democratic Republic of the Congo

It is likely that the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, driven primarily by persistent eastern insurgencies and recurrent cross-border escalation risk with Rwanda-linked actors despite active mediation frameworks.

High likelihood of continued major fighting in North Kivu/South Kivu/Ituri, with episodic spikes around key towns and supply routes. Mediation mechanisms may reduce the chance of overt Rwanda–DRC conventional clashes, but proxy dynamics and border incidents remain plausible. MONUSCO mandate adjustments and any further drawdowns are key swing factors for local security vacuums.

If economic-integration and verification mechanisms partially function, interstate escalation risk could gradually decline, but internal conflict may persist unless security-sector reform and local governance improve materially. A durable reduction in violence would require credible DDR, disruption of armed-group financing, and improved FARDC cohesion. Absent these, the east likely remains chronically insecure with periodic high-intensity offensives.

Scope and definition “Direct involvement” is met if FARDC engages in sustained, significant fighting against organized armed groups (already occurring) or if cross-border clashes with Rwanda-linked forces escalate.

Threat drivers Eastern DRC remains structurally conflict-prone: a dense ecosystem of armed groups, competition over territory and mineral rents, communal self-defense mobilization, and porous borders. M23’s operational momentum and the persistence of ADF-linked terrorism sustain high lethality and displacement. FARDC’s chronic weaknesses—logistics, command and control, corruption, and uneven cohesion—raise the probability that localized shocks become prolonged campaigns rather than contained incidents. The use of drones/airstrikes and reliance on allied militias can increase tactical reach but also raises escalation and civilian-harm risks.

Interstate escalation channel (Rwanda) The principal “rupture” risk is renewed direct Rwanda–DRC confrontation via M23 support allegations and border incidents. However, current mediation architecture (U.S./Qatar/AU-linked mechanisms) and the prospect of targeted sanctions create costs for overt interstate escalation, pushing competition back toward deniable proxy dynamics rather than open war.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks (pre-mortem stabilizers) Kinshasa’s core regime survival incentives favor avoiding a full interstate war it cannot sustain. International attention, UN Security Council scrutiny, and residual UN peacekeeping/mandate adaptation provide some restraint and monitoring even as drawdowns create gaps. Regional economic integration frameworks, if partially implemented, can align elites toward de-escalation around trade and critical-minerals governance.

Net assessment Because significant armed conflict is already entrenched and security-sector reform remains slow, the base rate strongly favors continued major fighting. Diplomacy may reduce the probability of a conventional Rwanda–DRC war, but it is unlikely to end large-scale internal conflict within three years.