Cameroon

Cameroon is assessed as a roughly even-chance case (about 55%) for direct involvement in significant armed conflict within the next three years, driven primarily by persistent internal insurgencies and localized violence rather than high-probability interstate war.

Conflict intensity likely remains broadly stable-to-elevated: continued jihadist attacks in the Far North and persistent separatist violence in the North-West/South-West, with episodic urban or corridor disruptions. The main near-term swing factor is political/security handling of post-election tensions and localized resource/communal disputes that can trigger short, sharp spikes in violence.

Over five years, the key structural risk is a governance/succession shock that degrades cohesion of the security apparatus and bargaining space with armed actors, enabling wider territorial contestation. Offsetting this, Cameroon’s core-state durability, economic gravity (Douala corridor), and regional security cooperation should continue to limit the probability of a classic interstate war, keeping risk concentrated in internal conflict trajectories.

Risk definition and scope This estimate covers direct involvement in significant armed conflict, including major internal fighting and cross-border kinetic incidents, not routine crime or protests.

Threat drivers Cameroon already experiences protracted armed conflict in multiple regions. In the Far North, Islamist militant violence remains elevated into 2026, sustaining displacement and insecurity. In the North-West/South-West, the separatist insurgency continues to generate lethal incidents and periodic disruption, with potential for spikes around political flashpoints. Separately, localized communal/resource disputes and governance grievances can escalate into deadly clashes and targeted attacks on state symbols, adding volatility beyond the two main conflict systems.

Escalation pathways (next 36 months) The most plausible route to “significant” conflict is intensification of existing internal wars: (a) a renewed operational surge by jihadist factions along the Lake Chad basin, including IED/drone adaptation and attacks on security forces and rural communities; (b) a separatist escalation or harsher counterinsurgency cycle that increases casualty rates and territorial contestation; (c) post-election legitimacy disputes or elite succession uncertainty that weakens command cohesion and widens the operating space for armed groups.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks The central state remains intact and continues to prioritize security spending, elite units, and administrative control of core cities and economic corridors. Cameroon also benefits from regional security architectures and bilateral/multilateral cooperation that, while imperfect, reduce the odds that border insecurity becomes a full interstate war. Economic interdependence through Douala’s port creates shared incentives among neighbors to avoid major escalation that would sever trade lifelines.

Net assessment The baseline risk is elevated because conflict is ongoing and adaptive, but the modal outlook is continued contained insurgency and localized flare-ups rather than nationwide collapse or interstate war. The probability therefore clusters around an even-chance level, with downside risk concentrated in governance/succession shocks and sustained militant adaptation.