Côte d’Ivoire

Unlikely (roughly one-in-five) that Côte d’Ivoire will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years; the main risk is localized jihadist spillover and election-linked violence escalating beyond containment.

Most likely: continued relative stability with heightened security posture in the north and episodic political arrests/protests. Terrorism risk persists but is more likely to manifest as isolated border-area attacks than sustained campaigns. Watch for refugee inflows from Mali/Burkina Faso and any confirmed repeat of lethal incidents like 2021-era border attacks.

Risk rises modestly beyond three years if managed succession fails or if Sahel insurgent pressure continues pushing south, creating persistent cells and communal self-defense dynamics. Conversely, sustained investment in border governance, intelligence-led operations, and credible political opening could keep conflict limited to low-level incidents rather than significant armed conflict.

Threat drivers The dominant pathway to significant armed conflict is asymmetric spillover from Burkina Faso/Mali into the northern border belt, including attacks on security forces and potential mass displacement that strains local governance. Regional security architecture remains degraded by Sahel state fragmentation and reduced coordination, increasing cross-border mobility of armed actors and weapons. A secondary pathway is domestic political crisis: the 2025 electoral cycle consolidated power amid opposition exclusion and protest restrictions, raising the risk of episodic violence, especially if repression catalyzes durable militant networks.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Côte d’Ivoire retains stronger state capacity than most neighbors: comparatively functional fiscal access, sustained security investment, and external security partnerships (France/US and others) that improve training, intelligence, and rapid response. Since 2021, reported terrorist incidents have been limited, suggesting some effectiveness of border-focused counterterrorism posture. The country’s economic and diplomatic positioning also incentivizes elites to avoid escalation that would jeopardize investment and international support.

Net assessment (threat minus resilience) The balance favors continuity: risks concentrate in the north and around political flashpoints, but the most likely outcomes are contained attacks, policing-heavy responses, and localized communal tensions rather than nationwide civil war or interstate war. Direct interstate kinetic conflict with Burkina Faso or Mali remains unlikely; border incidents are more plausibly tactical security operations than deliberate escalation.

Indicators to watch Sustained uptick in cross-border attacks inside Côte d’Ivoire; formation of persistent insurgent cells beyond the border departments; large-scale defections or factionalization within security forces; and a shift from protest repression to organized armed resistance in opposition strongholds.