Central African Republic

Likely (around 70%) that the Central African Republic will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, primarily via persistent internal armed-group violence and border spillover rather than interstate war.

Most likely: continued relative stability in Bangui and main corridors, with episodic but serious violence in the southeast and border zones. Key downside risks are Sudan spillover incidents, militia realignments (especially in Haut-Mbomou/Haut-Oubangui), and any reduction in MINUSCA mobility from funding constraints. Large-scale nationwide offensives are possible but not the modal outcome.

If MINUSCA draws down without a credible, funded transition and FACA capacity gains, conflict risk rises materially through 2029–2031. If international support persists and DDR/ceasefire compliance expands, CAR could sustain a “managed insecurity” equilibrium with localized violence but fewer strategic threats to major cities. Sudan’s trajectory remains the main external swing factor.

Threat drivers CAR’s core risk is internal: fragmented armed groups, weak state presence outside key corridors, and recurring localized violence (notably in the southeast). Recent reporting indicates rising clashes in Haut-Mbomou linked to the breakdown of a prior alignment involving Azande Ani Kpi Gbe and state-aligned forces, consistent with CAR’s pattern of shifting militia bargains. Human rights reporting and protection-of-civilians incidents remain elevated, indicating persistent coercive capacity among armed actors and limited deterrence in remote areas.

External and regional accelerants The Sudan war increases cross-border armed movement, weapons circulation, and resource/land disputes along a porous frontier. This is more likely to produce raids, communal violence, and armed-group opportunism than a classic interstate conflict, but it still qualifies as direct involvement in significant armed conflict if sustained. Regionally, weakened ECCAS cohesion reduces mediation and early-warning capacity, marginally raising escalation risk by lowering diplomatic “shock absorbers.”

Resilience and stabilizers (pre-mortem) Several mechanisms plausibly keep conflict below nationwide escalation: the post-December 2025 elections were comparatively calm; the government has expanded control in parts of the country; and ceasefire/demobilization efforts show some traction. MINUSCA remains the central systemic firebreak, providing logistics, civilian protection, and political support that reduces the probability of rapid rebel advances on major population centers. Local conflict-management deals on the Sudan border also demonstrate that micro-level bargains can dampen violence when backed by credible security presence.

Net assessment The balance remains unfavorable: CAR’s security improvements are real but heavily externally scaffolded, while armed-group fragmentation and border spillover create multiple pathways to renewed significant fighting. The most probable trajectory is continued “patchwork” conflict (peripheral but serious), not full state collapse; however, the baseline likelihood of significant armed conflict involvement remains high given weak institutions and persistent armed competition.