Bolivia

Bolivia is unlikely to be directly involved in significant armed conflict in the next three years, with risk concentrated in episodic internal political violence rather than interstate war.

Most plausible pathway is renewed protest waves over prices, fuel supply, and institutional disputes, with intermittent lethal clashes and transport disruption. The state is likely to rely on negotiated settlements with unions and social movements, limiting escalation. Interstate conflict remains very unlikely; border incidents would be isolated and quickly de-escalated.

If economic adjustment and institutional reform stall, Bolivia could see more frequent high-intensity unrest and localized armed criminality, raising the chance of sustained internal violence. Conversely, credible electoral administration, gradual fiscal repair, and improved policing/judicial capacity would keep conflict below civil-war thresholds. Interstate war remains a low-probability tail risk absent a major regional shock.

Net assessment Risk is driven more by domestic contention than external threats. Bolivia faces recurring high-intensity protest cycles, road blockades, and localized lethal incidents tied to political polarization and economic adjustment. These dynamics can produce short bursts of violence and state overreaction, but they lack the organization, territorial control, and sustained armed capacity typical of civil war.

Threat drivers The key upward pressures are (a) economic fragility and fuel/FX constraints that make austerity politically explosive, (b) factional competition and delegitimation risks around electoral institutions, and (c) criminal economies in some regions that can intersect with politics and weaken rule of law. Recent reporting on nationwide blockades and clashes underscores the potential for episodic fatalities and temporary paralysis of transport corridors.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Bolivia’s armed forces are sized and oriented for internal security support and border presence, not sustained interstate operations; capability gaps and geography reduce incentives for external adventurism. Regionally, South America’s interstate war rate remains low, and Bolivia’s neighbors have limited incentive to escalate disputes into open conflict. Domestic politics, while polarized, still channels competition through elections, unions, and negotiated settlements; repeated patterns of bargaining after escalation act as a pressure-release valve.

Interstate exposure Historic grievances (notably maritime access) persist but are largely institutionalized through diplomacy and legal/political channels rather than mobilization for war. No alliance commitments plausibly drag Bolivia into a major external conflict, and its foreign policy rebalancing mainly affects economic alignment rather than military entanglement.

What would change the score A sharp breakdown of electoral legitimacy combined with sustained security-force fragmentation; emergence of armed groups with durable financing and territorial control; or a severe economic shock that produces prolonged nationwide violence beyond protest dynamics.