Bosnia and Herzegovina

Unlikely (roughly one-in-five) that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, with the main risk concentrated in a low-probability but high-impact constitutional rupture scenario.

Most likely: continued constitutional brinkmanship, sporadic protests, and intimidation incidents around elections and court decisions, with EUFOR/NATO maintaining a tripwire and reassurance role. Key watchpoints are any attempt to operationalize parallel RS security/judicial structures, or a sharp escalation in inter-entity policing disputes. Armed conflict remains unlikely but the risk of localized violent incidents is non-trivial.

Over five years, risk depends on whether EU accession conditionality and economic incentives strengthen state functionality or whether chronic paralysis normalizes de facto partition. If external engagement weakens or deterrence erodes, the probability of a crisis-driven security incident rises, especially around Brčko and mixed municipalities. Conversely, sustained EUFOR/NATO support and credible EU integration steps keep escalation largely political.

Risk definition Significant armed conflict would most plausibly take the form of localized interstate-adjacent violence or internal armed clashes triggered by an attempted entity-level break with Dayton, contested control of state security institutions, or violence around sensitive corridors (notably Brčko).

Threat drivers The dominant driver is constitutional confrontation: Republika Srpska leadership has periodically advanced steps implying parallel state functions (judiciary, security prerogatives) and rejection of the High Representative’s authority, creating a pathway to a security dilemma if state agencies attempt enforcement and entity authorities resist. Political intimidation incidents and inflammatory symbolism increase the chance of street violence and opportunistic armed incidents. Widespread small-arms availability and organized crime elevate lethality if unrest occurs. External influence operations, especially Russia-aligned narratives opposing Euro-Atlantic integration, can harden zero-sum bargaining and encourage brinkmanship.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Bosnia and Herzegovina’s core stabilizer is not domestic cohesion but external constraint. The Dayton architecture, OHR’s executive tools, and the continued presence of EUFOR Althea and NATO HQ Sarajevo raise the expected cost of armed escalation and improve early warning. Neighboring states face strong disincentives to sponsor kinetic escalation given EU/NATO ties, economic exposure, and the likelihood of rapid diplomatic and financial retaliation. The Armed Forces of BiH remain unified at the state level and oriented toward interoperability and peace support rather than offensive capacity; this reduces the probability of organized large-scale fighting, even if it does not eliminate the risk of fragmentation under extreme political shock.

Net assessment The modal trajectory is continued institutional paralysis, episodic protests, and legal-political confrontation, not war. The principal risk is a low-probability cascade: a decisive legal move against key RS leaders, an attempted RS institutional secession, a contested enforcement action, and localized armed clashes that international forces struggle to contain quickly. Current evidence supports elevated vigilance but not a base-rate break toward imminent conflict.