Burkina Faso

It is likely (roughly 80–90%) that Burkina Faso will be directly involved in significant armed conflict within the next three years, primarily through sustained internal insurgent violence with episodic cross-border incidents.

Conflict remains very likely. Expect continued JNIM/IS Sahel attacks on garrisons, convoys, and towns in the Sahel, East, and Boucle du Mouhoun, with periodic mass-casualty events and further displacement. Junta repression and militia-centric operations may harden regime control in core cities but will likely worsen civilian harm and intelligence deficits, sustaining the insurgency.

Absent a major shift in regional coordination, force professionalism, and political inclusion, Burkina Faso is likely to face a protracted insurgency with fluctuating frontlines rather than a clean victory by either side. A partial stabilization scenario is plausible if security forces improve logistics and discipline and if local deals reduce violence in select corridors, but communal polarization and cross-border spillover will remain chronic risks.

Security Situation Burkina Faso’s dominant risk is ongoing internal armed conflict against jihadist groups (notably JNIM and IS Sahel). Reporting indicates frequent complex attacks on towns, bases, and supply routes, with high civilian harm and displacement. This is not episodic terrorism; it is sustained contestation over territory, mobility corridors, and local governance.

Threat Drivers Insurgent operational adaptation (IED interdiction, multi-prong raids, exploitation of seams between regular forces and auxiliaries) raises the probability of continued large-scale violence. State counterinsurgency relies heavily on mass mobilization and pro-government auxiliaries (VDP), which can expand manpower but also increases command-and-control problems and the risk of reprisals. Documented abuses and collective punishment dynamics intensify communal grievances, especially where ethnicity is politicized, creating durable recruitment and intelligence advantages for insurgents.

Governance and Cohesion The junta’s tightening control over political life and civic space reduces peaceful channels for dissent and weakens accountability over security forces. This can improve short-term regime stability, but it also increases the risk of elite fragmentation, coercive overreach, and information failure in the security campaign.

Resilience and Firebreaks (Pre-mortem) Burkina Faso still has stabilizers that can prevent total state collapse: a strong incentive for the officer corps to preserve the regime; urban strongholds and administrative continuity in core areas; external security partnerships and arms sourcing diversification; and neighboring coastal states’ preference for containment over interstate escalation. These factors support a scenario of persistent conflict rather than decisive insurgent victory.

Externalization Risk Border incidents with Ghana and tensions narratives with Côte d’Ivoire illustrate spillover pressure, but structural constraints (limited conventional capacity, mutual economic interests, and regional aversion to open interstate war) make a deliberate interstate conflict less likely than continued cross-border raids, hot pursuits, and localized confrontations.

Net Assessment High likelihood of significant armed conflict persists because threat drivers (insurgent capability, governance deficits, militia dynamics) outweigh resilience and diplomatic firebreaks.