Benin

Unlikely but plausible: Benin faces a roughly one-in-three chance of direct involvement in significant armed conflict within three years, driven mainly by northern jihadist spillover and elevated civil-military fragility, with interstate war remaining low-probability.

Risk remains elevated around the 2026 election and immediate post-putsch security-sector management. Expect continued militant attacks in northern border departments and periodic security incidents tied to parks and cross-border corridors. A renewed coup attempt is possible but not the modal outcome; the more likely pattern is tightened internal security, selective arrests, and sustained counterterror operations with external support.

If Sahel instability persists and coastal states become the next operational depth for jihadist groups, Benin’s northern conflict could become more entrenched and economically corrosive. The decisive variable is political succession and civil-military relations: an inclusive transition and disciplined force management would keep violence localized; a repressive, factionalized transition could widen insurgent opportunity and raise the chance of broader internal armed conflict.

Net assessment Benin’s three-year conflict risk is elevated versus its historical baseline, but remains below “likely” because violence is geographically concentrated and the state still functions. The dominant pathway to “significant armed conflict” is sustained insurgent violence in the north/northeast (and potentially east), not conventional interstate war.

Threat drivers Jihadist groups linked to Sahel theaters (notably JNIM, with some reporting of Islamic State-linked activity) have demonstrated capacity for mass-casualty attacks on Beninese forces and use protected areas and border corridors for mobility. A second driver is political-military fragility after the December 2025 failed putsch: it signals factionalism, grievance within ranks, and higher coup/counter-coup tail risk during the 2026 political transition. A third driver is deteriorating security cooperation with Niger amid diplomatic and intelligence disputes, which can reduce border coordination and widen operating space for armed groups.

Resilience and systemic firebreaks Benin’s security apparatus has shown continuity and learning: sustained operations (including Operation Mirador) and improved air-ground integration indicate growing tactical competence and willingness to contest territory. The state’s core institutions and capital-region control appear intact despite the coup attempt, limiting the probability of rapid state breakdown. External partnerships (ECOWAS engagement, bilateral support from Nigeria and France, and broader security cooperation) provide deterrence against unconstitutional seizure of power and add capacity against militant networks.

Key judgment The most probable outcome is continued, episodic but serious insurgent violence in northern border zones, with periodic spikes. A nationwide civil war scenario remains unlikely unless political repression, succession uncertainty, and military purges combine to fracture command-and-control while insurgent pressure simultaneously intensifies.

Watch indicators Large-scale defections or mutinies; sustained attacks moving south of current hotspots; prolonged Benin–Niger diplomatic freeze that halts operational coordination; election-related violence that triggers emergency rule and security-force fragmentation.